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Promises of Law: The Unlawful Dispossession of Japanese Canadians
Abstract
This article is about the origins, betrayal, and litigation of a promise of law. In 1942, while it ordered the
internment of over twenty-one thousand Canadians of Japanese descent, the Canadian government
enacted orders in council authorizing the Custodian of Enemy Property to seize all real and personal
property owned by Japanese Canadians living within coastal British Columbia. Demands from the
Japanese-Canadian community and concern from within the corridors of government resulted in
amendments to those orders stipulating that the Custodian held that property as a “protective” trust and
would return it to Japanese Canadians at the conclusion of the war. That is not what happened. In
January 1943, a new order in council authorized the sale of all property seized from Japanese Canadians.
The trust abandoned, a promise broken, the Custodian sold everything. This article traces the promise to
protect property from its origins in the federal bureaucracy and demands on the streets to its demise in
Nakashima v Canada, the Exchequer Court decision that held that the legal promise carried no legal
consequence. We argue that the failure of the promise should not obscure its history as a product of
multi-vocal processes, community activism, conflicting wartime pressures, and competing conceptions of
citizenship, legality, and justice. Drawing from a rich array of archival sources, our article places the legacy
of the property loss of Japanese Canadians at the disjuncture between law as a blunt instrument capable
of gross injustice and its role as a social institution of good faith.
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streets to its demise in Nakashima v Canada, the Exchequer Court decision that held that the
legal promise carried no legal consequence. We argue that the failure of the promise should
not obscure its history as a product of multi-vocal processes, community activism, conflicting
wartime pressures, and competing conceptions of citizenship, legality, and justice. Drawing
from a rich array of archival sources, our article places the legacy of the property loss of
Japanese Canadians at the disjuncture between law as a blunt instrument capable of gross
injustice and its role as a social institution of good faith.
Cet article aborde les origines, la trahison et le litige entourant une promesse juridique. En
1942, alors qu’il ordonne l’internement de plus de 21 000 Canadiens d’ascendance japonaise,
le gouvernement canadien promulgue des décrets autorisant le séquestre des biens ennemis
à saisir tous les biens immobiliers et personnels appartenant à des Canadiens d’origine
japonaise vivant dans les régions côtières de la Colombie-Britannique. Face aux demandes
de la communauté nippo-canadienne et aux préoccupations soulevées au sein même du
gouvernement, ces décrets seront modifiés afin de préciser que le séquestre détient ces
biens en fiducie « productrice » et qu’il les rendrait aux Canadiens d’origine japonaise à la
fin de la guerre. La réalité allait être tout autre. En janvier 1943, un nouveau décret autorise
la vente de tous les biens confisqués aux Canadiens d’origine japonaise. La confiance
s’amenuise, la promesse vole en éclats, le séquestre se départit de tous les biens sous sa
garde. Cet article relate la promesse de protéger ces biens, depuis ses origines au sein de la
bureaucratie fédérale et les revendications exprimées dans la rue, jusqu’à sa violation dans
l’arrêt Nakashima c. Canada, rendu par la Cour de l’Échiquier, qui décide de ne reconnaître
aucune conséquence juridique. Nous soutenons qu’en dépit de sa violation, cette promesse
revêt une importance historique qui ne saurait être occultée, dans la mesure où elle est le
fruit de l’expression de différents points de vue, de la mobilisation populaire, des pressions
conflictuelles en temps de guerre et de visions contradictoires sur la citoyenneté, la légalité
et la justice. À partir d’une mine d’archives, nous retraçons dans cet article les conséquences
de la perte des biens des Canadiens d’origine japonaise pour illustrer la dichotomie du droit,
entre instrument grossier capable d’une injustice flagrante et institution sociale œuvrant de
bonne foi.
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ON THE EVENING OF 28 MAY 1944, Eikichi Nakashima, Tadao Wakabayashi,

Jitaro Tanaka and their lawyer, J. Arthur MacLennan, entered the dining room
at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa. Given the anxiety over the ongoing war in
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the Pacific and the hotel’s history of racial exclusion, the appearance of three
Japanese Canadians in the Laurier’s ornate dining room likely drew unwanted
attention.1 But Nakashima, Wakabayashi, and Tanaka had greater concerns than
the prejudices of their fellow diners. In September 1942, government officials
had forcibly removed them and their families from their Vancouver homes,
seized control of their real and personal property, and interned them in crowded
camps in the interior of British Columbia. They were, along with over twenty
one thousand other Canadians of Japanese descent, “the enemy that never was,”2
victims of a “politics of racism” that disregarded their basic human rights.3 In the
spring of 1944, Nakashima, Wakabayashi, and Tanaka came to Ottawa not to
protest those injustices, but to place their faith in the promise of law.
This article is a history of a largely forgotten legal promise. It is a story of
law’s capacity to carry multiple meanings—protection and coercion, trust and
duplicity, justice and injustice—and to shift in meaning over time. The racist
treatment of Japanese Canadians before, during, and after the Second World
War has been the subject of important scholarship,4 but legal historians have
1.

2.
3.
4.

The dinner was sufficiently memorable to appear in MacLennan’s obituary. ATC, “Nos
Disparus: J. Arthur MacLennan, Q.C.” (1997) 55:1 The Advocate 123 at 124. For a sample
of reporting detailing rumours of an imminent “enormous Pacific offensive,” see “Tokyo’s
Next Bombing Very Close, U.S. Is Told” Toronto Daily Star (30 May 1944) 1. On racial
exclusions of the period, see Eric M Adams, “Errors of Fact and Law: Race, Space, and
Hockey in Christie v York” (2012) 62:4 UTLJ 463. At the Christie v York trial one of the
former waiters at the Chateau Laurier recalled, “If I remember rightly, at the Chateau Laurier
we were told not to serve colored people.” Christie v York Corporation (1937), 75 RJQ 136
(Sup Ct) (Discovery Transcript), Bibliothèque et Archives nationals du Québec.
Ken Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians (Toronto,
McClelland & Stewart, 1976).
Ann Gomer Sunahara, The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the
Second World War, 2nd (Ottawa: Ann Sunahara, 2000).
In addition to Adachi and Sunahara, supra notes 2, 3, see e.g. Mona Oikawa, Cartographies
of Violence: Japanese Canadian Women, Memory, and the Subjects of the Internment (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2012); Pamela Sugiman, ““Life is Sweet”: Vulnerability and
Composure in the Wartime Narratives of Japanese Canadians” (2009) 43:1 J Can Stud
186; Stephanie Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry
in North America, 1942-49 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); W Peter Ward, White Canada
Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Patricia Roy, A White Man’s Province: British
Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1989); Ibid, The Oriental Question: Consolidating a White Man’s
Province, 1914-41 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003); Ibid, The
Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-67 (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 2007) [Roy, Triumph of Citizenship].
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overlooked key aspects of these events, including the laws that dispossessed
Japanese Canadians of everything they owned. While interning Japanese
Canadians, the federal government seized control of all of their real and personal
property within the “protected area in British Columbia.”5 In the spring of 1943,
federal officials began to sell virtually everything that the government had taken,
often below market value.6 Families lost heirlooms, vibrant businesses, and
everyday possessions. They lost cars, boats, books, toys, furniture, and cameras.
They lost homes and farms. Beyond the tangible, Canadians of Japanese descent
lost opportunities, neighbourhoods, and communities. They lost connections
to place. They lost retirements, livelihoods, and educations. They lost agency
over their property and life choices. They lost, as Rikizo Yoneyama poignantly
expressed in a defiant letter to the Minister of Justice, “more than just a home.”
Japanese Canadians, he lamented, lost “the foundation of security and freedom
as Canadian citizens.”7
The sale of Japanese-Canadian-owned property was consistent with other
moments in Canadian history when promises lost meaning as government
interests shifted, officials’ memories (conveniently) faded, and new legal
interpretations of those promises took their place. The events chronicled here
echo the federal government’s treaty promises to First Nations, which were
backed by oral promises that officials later abandoned in favour of narrow
legal interpretations—with devastating consequences for Indigenous peoples.8
5.
6.

7.

8.

Adachi, supra note 2 at 208-209.
Before this date, important categories of property had already been sold including
automobiles and fishing vessels. However, in the spring of 1943, the government authorized
and undertook the forced sale of everything else that Japanese Canadians had been forced
to leave behind. On the evolution of federal policy in this respect, see Jordan Stanger-Ross
& Landscapes of Injustice Research Collective, “Suspect Properties: The Vancouver Origins
of the Forced Sale of Japanese-Canadian-owned Property, WWII” (2016) 15:4 Journal of
Planning History 271 [Stanger-Ross & LIRC, “Suspect Properties”].
Héritage Project, “Rikizo Yoneyama to Minister of Justice” (31 July 1944), online: <heritage.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c9476/1448?r=0&s=2>. See Jordan Stanger-Ross,
Nicholas Blomley & the Landscapes of Injustice Research Collective, “‘My land is worth a
million dollars’: How Japanese-Canadians contested their dispossession in the 1940s” (2017)
35:3 L & Hist Rev.
See Arthur J Ray, Jim Miller & Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of
Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000) at 214; James
Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal
Life (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2013), especially ch 6-9. On remembering and
forgetting Crown promises, see William Wicken, “‘Heard It From Our Grandfathers’:
Mi’kmaq Treaty Tradition and the Syliboy Case of 1928” (1995) 44 UNBLJ 145. See
also Eric M Adams, “Ghosts in Court: Jonathan Belcher and the Proclamation of 1762”
(2004) 27 Dal LJ 321.
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The dispossession of Japanese Canadians is another instance in which the Crown
created circumstances of dispossession coupled with a paternalistic promise of
protection that it did not keep. When the federal government seized the property
of Japanese Canadians, it made assurances in law, repeated by officials to Japanese
Canadians on the doorsteps of their homes, that the property would be held as a
“protective measure only” and would someday be returned. This article excavates
this legal promise to protect, examines its reception among property owners,
and assesses the little known legal case it initiated, Nakashima v Canada.9 A full
accounting of the power of law in twentieth-century Canada must wrestle equally
with its dual capacity to impose and constrain power.
Given the eventual fate of Japanese-Canadian-owned property, the
dispossession can appear as a linear story in which widespread racist views
always prevailed. One possibility is that the promise to protect was a ruse, a tool
that encouraged Japanese Canadians to cooperate with their uprooting and
internment, but abandoned when that process was completed and the property
could be acquired by whites and other non-Japanese Canadians.10 The influence
of racist leaders in the political process and the vehemence with which they
expressed their discriminatory objectives encourages this view. Racist prejudice
against Japanese Canadians intensified after the war began. Ian Mackenzie, the
sole British Columbia representative in the federal cabinet and a key figure in
the formulation of orders in council concerning Japanese Canadians, advocated
the exile of the entire community (of which 60 per cent were Canadian born)
to Japan on the grounds that he did “not believe the Japanese are an assimilable
race.”11 Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King privately agreed that
“[e]veryone of them … would be saboteurs and would help Japan when the
moment came.”12 Glenn McPherson, Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property
9.

[1947] Ex CR 486 [Nakashima]. The decision is much less well known (even among
Canadians) than the American case law on the Japanese American internment. See
e.g. Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943), 63 S Ct 1375 [Hirabayashi];
Ex Parte Endo, 323 US 283 (1944); Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944),
65 S Ct 193 [Korematsu]. On the American cases, see Eugene V Rostow, “The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster” (1945) 54:3 Yale LJ 489; Eric K Yamamoto et al, Race,
Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment, 2nd (New York:
Wolters Kluwer, 2013).
10. This perspective is conveyed in the most widely cited source on the dispossession of Japanese
Canadians, The Politics of Racism. Sunahara, supra note 3.
11. Ian Mackenzie to John Godwin (7 December 1942), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada
[LAC] (MG27 III-B5, vol 25, file 70-25(3)).
12. LAC, “Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King” (28 February 1942), online: <www.bac-lac.
gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/pages/
item.aspx?IdNumber=23884>.
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and the most important federal bureaucrat handling the property of Japanese
Canadians, wrote that the Japanese Canadians had “developed a high inferiority
complex and realize … that the only way the Yellow Race can obtain their place in
the Sun is by winning the war.”13 Politicians and government officials might have
had little compunction in misleading the members of a ‘race’ that they despised.
In addition to racism on the part of government officials, some evidence
suggests that the laws protecting Japanese-Canadian-owned property were meant
from the outset to deceive. Before the war in the Pacific began, officials in the
British Columbia government had their eyes on the property holdings of the
Japanese-Canadian community. A “quiet” government initiative compiled a list
of “the names, addresses, and business of Japanese who hold trade licences in
British Columbia” as part of a study into “the extent and character of oriental
penetration in the economy of this Province.”14 After the war began, McPherson
met with City of Vancouver officials on 1 September 1942, while Japanese
Canadians were still being rounded up and sent inland, to discuss the city’s
interest in acquiring their property. McPherson advised city leaders to delay
pursuing this plan, at least for the moment, “to avoid taking any action that
would conflict with the steps now being taken” to remove Japanese Canadians.15
McPherson may have hinted to city officials, however, that the Custodian’s
approach to Japanese-Canadian-owned property would not always be one of
protection.16 In a similar vein, once the entire Japanese-Canadian population
of coastal British Columbia had been uprooted, George Collins, Chairman of
the British Columbia Security Commission told his staff that the organization
would now shift its focus: “[t]hese people will be dispersed across Canada in
small groups … That is the undeclared policy of Ottawa.”17 If an “undeclared”
plan to permanently exile Japanese Canadians from the province existed from the

13. Memorandum Re Japanese (December 18, 1941), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 2, file 16).
14. G Neil Perry to Colonel E Pepler, (10 August 1940), Victoria, Royal BC Museum/BC
Archives, (GR-0268, box 14, file 3).
15. City Council Minutes (1 September 1942), Vancouver, City of Vancouver Archives (City of
Vancouver Fonds, series 27, box 27-E-6, folder 17: Japanese Property, Powell Street).
16. Quoted the next day in the Japanese-Canadian newspaper, The New Canadian, Alderman
George Buscombe, who had attended the meeting with McPherson, said “[w]e’ll wait and see
what happens after September 30,” when he presumed the internment would be complete.
“We don’t want the Japanese to return here after the war,” he continued, “[T]hey are going to
outbreed the whites and eventually outnumber us.” “Custodian Not Selling Real Estate Left
Behind by Evacuated Owners” (2 September 1942) 1-2.
17. Minutes of the BC Security Commission Conference (6 March 1943), Ottawa, LAC
(RG36-27, vol 7, file 163) [emphasis added].
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start of Canada’s war in the Pacific, then its blueprints could not have included
Japanese Canadians maintaining their homes in coastal British Columbia.18
Direct evidence of the creation of the laws of dispossession, however,
suggests that the ubiquity of racism and the government’s ultimate violation of
the promise should not obscure its full history. The promise to protect resulted
from multi-vocal processes, conflicting pressures, and competing conceptions of
citizenship, legality, and justice, rather than simple racist deceit and financial
opportunism. Certainly, some of the officials responsible for drafting the laws
of dispossession believed that promises to protect would facilitate the uprooting
and internment. Yet those same officials—almost all of them lawyers—also
saw the protection of property as a requirement of orderly governance, natural
justice, and inchoate notions of citizenship and liberty. Lofty sentiments are more
likely to find their way into official documentation than is a secretive plot to
deceive. Archives have gaps, some of them deliberate. Nonetheless, the records of
law-making, and the broader context in which they are embedded, demonstrate
that officials also intended the promise of protection to carry legal significance,
and to create a trust, in both the legal and colloquial sense, in the government’s
treatment of seized property. From this perspective, we might conceive of the
dispossession as fundamentally unlawful on its own terms, rather than as the
regrettable culmination of legalized racism.
Part I of this article explains how and why the orders of dispossession took
shape. It reveals a wartime bureaucracy of conflicting interests, intense pressures,
and administrative constraints. From this context arose the promise to protect
the property of Japanese Canadians. The story of that promise has been lost in
large part because of the decision of Justice Thorson in Nakashima v Canada, the
focus of Part II. In Nakashima, the promise to protect disappeared under evasive
legal argument, medieval conceptions of Crown liability, absolute deference to
government decision-making in times of war and judicial sanction of racialized
injustice. Contrary to the position adopted by Canada to win the Nakashima
case, we argue that the promise to protect enacted a legal trust as the product of
the interaction of text, intention, administrative action, and the interpretations
of those subject to it. The risk in overlooking the promise to protect property is
to cast Canada’s wartime history as inexorable. Throughout this history, there
18. Note, however, that other federal officials, including Ephraim H Coleman, Undersecretary
of State, saw the decision to force the sale of the property of Japanese Canadians as a
change in policy toward permanent exile from BC. Coleman did not understand this as
the implicit approach from the outset. See Stanger-Ross & LIRC, “Suspect Properties,”
supra note 6 at 280.
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were choices made, paths not taken, doubts supressed, and promises made.
To focus only on promises broken or, worse yet, to ignore legal promises entirely,
is to misrepresent the laws of dispossession and to silence Japanese Canadians
and the federal officials who inscribed in law an obligation to protect. As part
of this collection in honour of Douglas Hay, we follow his use of legal history
to scrape away the obfuscating veneers painted in judicial decisions to reveal
the varied shades of colour that lie beneath the surface.19 The dispossession of
Japanese Canadians was a complicated product of law—enabled by legal force,
yet equally constrained by legal principle. Its neglected history sheds light on the
nature of law and Canadian history in equal measure.

I. CREATING A PROMISE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
DISPOSSESSION ORDERS IN COUNCIL
The promise to protect property and its subsequent violation emerged out of the
context of Canada at war. In the emergency federal cabinet meeting on 1 September
1939, following news that Germany had attacked Poland, Justice Minister and
Acting Secretary of State, Ernest Lapointe, proclaimed an apprehended state of
war and invoked the War Measures Act (WMA).20 As in the First World War,
the WMA transferred virtually unlimited legislative authority to the federal
cabinet. In the broad words of the Act: “The Governor in Council may do and
authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and
regulations, as he may … deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence,

19. See generally, Jim Phillips, “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41:3 VUWLR 293.
20. RSC 1927, c 206 [WMA]. Despite being proclaimed on 1 September, the apprehended
state of war was backdated to 25 August 1939 to capture certain military purchases that had
already been made. For a history of the WMA, see F Murray Greenwood, “The Drafting
and Passage of the War Measures Act in 1914 and 1927: Object Lessons in the Need for
Vigilance” in W Wesley Pue & Barry Wright, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Law & Society:
Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988) 291. After passage of the
WMA in 1914, orders in council were passed to register enemy aliens and then to intern over
8,000 persons, the majority of whom were Ukrainian Canadians. See Bohdan S Kordan,
“‘They Will Be Dangerous’: Security and Control of Enemy Aliens in Canada, 1914” in
Barry Wright, Eric Tucker & Susan Binnie, eds, Canadian State Trials Volume IV: Security,
Dissent and the Limits of Toleration in War and Peace, 1914-1939 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2015) 44 at 45. See also,
Peter McDermott, “Enemy Aliens in the First World War: Legal and Constitutional Issues”
in ibid, 71 at 77.
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peace, order and welfare of Canada.”21 The Act specifically placed “appropriation,
control, forfeiture and disposition of property” within federal executive control.22
In litigation arising out of the First World War, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council upheld the constitutionality of the WMA under the federal power
to legislate for the “peace, order, and good government of Canada” in times of
national crisis.23 As one government committee summarized, the Act granted
“the Executive ample authority to take pretty well whatever action might be
found to be necessary to meet the exigencies of war.”24
Long before the war in the Pacific, Japanese Canadians had been the subject
of racist treatment under the law.25 In keeping with longstanding state hostility to
Japanese Canadians, on 1 October 1940, the Cabinet War Committee established
a “Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia,” to keep “the Government
constantly informed … as to the oriental situation in that Province.”26 Hundreds
of orders in council restricting the liberty of Japanese Canadians followed.
The eventual dispossession, internment, incarceration, exile, and prohibitions on
returning to British Columbia were all products of law: Orders in council drafted
by a federal bureaucracy and approved by committees of cabinet.
Following Canada’s declaration of war against Japan on 7 December 1941,27
the legal focus on Japanese Canadians intensified. A series of orders in council
21. WMA, supra note 20, s 3. The language parallels President Roosevelt’s Executive Order
No 9066 of 19 February 1942, subsequently ratified by Congress, authorizing actions
deemed “necessary or desirable to prescribe military areas … from which all persons may be
excluded.” Hirabayashi, supra note 9 at 86.
22. WMA, supra note 20. This is contrary to the clear peacetime allocation of matters of
“Property and Civil Rights” to provincial jurisdiction.
23. Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co v Manitoba Free Press Co, [1923] 3 DLR 629 at 633,
AC 695 [Fort Frances]. Fitzpatrick CJ also commented on this, holding that “[i]t seems to
me obvious that parliament intended, as the language used implies, to clothe the executive
with the widest powers in time of danger. Taken literally, the language of [section 3 of the
WMA] contains unlimited powers.” Re George Edwin Gray, [1918] 57 SCR 150 at 158-59,
42 DLR 1 [Re Gray].
24. Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Legislation, Report (Ottawa: King’s
Printer, 1939).
25. See Bruce Ryder, “Racism and the Constitution: The Constitutional Fate of British Columbia
Anti-Asian Immigration Legislation, 1884-1909” (1991) 29:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 619; Andrea
Geiger, “Writing Racial Barriers into Law: Upholding BC’s Denial of the Vote to its Japanese
Canadian Citizens, Homma v Cunningham, 1902” in Gail M Nomura & Louis Fiset, eds,
Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth
Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005).
26. PC 1941-117 (1941) Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1701, file 2247G). See also Adachi,
supra note 2 at 190-91.
27. PC 1941-9592 (1941), Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1741, file 2463G).
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over the ensuing months enabled the uprooting and dispossession of all those
living within the “protected area” of British Columbia, an enormous area of
land covering the coast to 100 miles inland.28 As a precursor to the internment,
in late February 1942, Order 1486 empowered the government to “require any
and all persons to leave such protected area.”29 On 4 March 1942, Order 1665
put the internment policy into legal effect. Citing the necessity of “the security
and defence of Canada,” the Order established the British Columbia Security
Commission (BCSC), headquartered in Vancouver, “to plan, supervise and direct
the evacuation from the protected areas of British Columbia of all persons of the
Japanese race.”30 The uprooting and internment of Japanese Canadians created
an immediate problem of what to do with the empty properties and vulnerable
possessions of Japanese Canadians forced from their homes. The solution was for
the Secretary of State, Norman McLarty, to take custody of seized property, and
promise its protection.
A. THE NEED TO PROMISE

The office of the Custodian of Enemy Property, acting under the authority of the
Secretary of State, administered the dispossession of Japanese Canadians. The
role of the Custodian evolved rapidly during the eight days between 24 February
1942, when the government announced its authority to require “any and all
persons” to leave the “protected area” of British Columbia, and 4 March, when
Order 1665 specified that this power would be applied to “all persons of the
Japanese race.” Prior to this crucial week, the Custodian managed only the
property of “all persons regardless of their nationality who reside in enemy or
enemy occupied territory” as well as the property of “all persons who are detained
under the Defense of Canada regulations.”31 Very little Japanese-Canadian-owned
property fit this description. As the Custodian specified in an announcement
on 12 December 1941, its activities did “not affect the property of persons of
the Japanese Race who are conducting themselves in a proper manner and who
28. PC 1942-365, Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1744, file 2487G). See Adachi, supra
note 2 at 199-224.
29. PC 1942-1986, (1941) C Gaz 3475.
30. PC 1942-1665 (1942) s 10(1), Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1750, file 2516G) [Order
1665][See Appendix I]. In addition to powers to “require by order any person of the Japanese
race, in any protected area in British Columbia … to leave his place of residence and proceed
to any other place within or without the protected area,” the order granted the Commission
the power to “make orders respecting the conduct, activities, and discipline of any person
evacuated under the provisions of these Regulations. Ibid, ss 11(1), (2).
31. Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy (1939), s 1(b)(ii), (iv), Ottawa,
LAC (RG125, vol 1550, file 11367, part 2).
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have not been detained.”32 At this juncture, the Custodian remained primarily an
agency of international affairs.
A late intervention in the planning of the internment transformed the
Custodian’s function.33 The first drafts of Order 1665 overlooked the question
of property and omitted the Custodian from the list of departments and
agencies (RCMP, Departments of Transport, National Defense, Munitions and
Supply, and Labour) whose involvement civil servants imagined necessary to the
internment.34 But what would become of the property of Japanese Canadians
once interned? Austin C. Taylor, the man most responsible for overseeing the
uprooting of Japanese Canadians in its first months, raised the question first.
Taylor agreed to serve as the Chairman of the BCSC and saw early drafts of Order
1665. A British Columbia mining magnate, reported to have invested $1 million
in war bonds, Taylor was a man accustomed to thinking about property.35 Seeing
an oversight in the proposed law, Taylor wrote Cabinet Minister Ian Mackenzie
on 28 February 1942 to inquire about a “custodian for evacuated property.”36
Mackenzie responded quickly. By 1 March he had secured from Ephraim
H. Coleman, the Undersecretary of State responsible for the operations of the
Custodian of Enemy Property, agreement to appoint “additional custodians …
with a view to providing for the care” of the property of Japanese Canadians.37
Officials failed to document the nature of the “care” envisioned (the exchange
between Mackenzie and Coleman took place by phone), but, whatever its details,
the order in council was revised by the Department of Justice and submitted to
cabinet the following day.38
32. Notice (newspaper clipping) (12 December 1941), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 1, file 10).
On property and the performance of citizenship, see Gregory S Alexander, “Property as
Propriety” (1998) 77:4 Neb L Rev 667.
33. Before this time, the Custodian controlled the property of several hundred Japanese
Canadians whose property was deemed “enemy” property. The new orders in council, vested
the Custodian with the property of more than 15,000 Japanese Canadians. See Glenn W
McPherson to EH Coleman (2 February 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 1, file 10).
Report of the Vancouver Office of the Custodian (G W McPherson) (25 February 1942),
Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 1, file 10).
34. Draft to His Excellency the Governor General in Council (28 February 1942), Ottawa, LAC
(RG 25, vol 3005, file 3464-q-40).
35. “Austin C Taylor, Financier, Dead,” The New York Times (2 November 1965).
36. Telegraph from Austin C Taylor to Ian Mackenzie (28 February 1942), Ottawa, LAC
(MG27 III-B5, vol 24, file 67-25(1)). On the origins of the Custodian of Enemy Property,
see Judith Roberts-Moore, “The Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property: An Overview of
the Office and its Records, 1920-1952” (1986) 22 Archivaria 95.
37. Ian Mackenzie to Prime Minister (2 March 1942), Ottawa, LAC (MG27 III-B5, vol 24,
file 67-25(1)).
38. Ian Mackenzie to John E Read (1 March 1942), Ottawa, LAC (MG27 III-B5, vol 24,
file 67-25(1)).
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Under the heading “Custody of Japanese Property,” Order 1665 provided
as follows:
12.(1) As a protective measure only, all property situated in any protected area of
British Columbia belonging to any person of the Japanese race resident in such area
… shall be vested in and subject to the control and management of the Custodian
as defined in the Regulations respecting Trading with the Enemy, 1939; provided,
however, that no commission shall be charged by the Custodian in respect of such
control and management.39

Section 12 concluded that the “property, rights and interests so vested in and
subject to the control and management of the Custodian … shall be dealt with
in such manner as the Governor in Council may direct.”40
The cavalier treatment of property in Order 1665 met with immediate
internal criticism. Among its most trenchant opponents was John Erskine
Read, legal advisor for the Department of External Affairs, and former Dean
of Dalhousie Law School.41 Reviewing Order 1665, he expressed a professorial
attentiveness and attachment to the common law of property and natural
justice. Read had written the first drafts of the Order, which had been silent
on the question of property.42 Having been assured on 1 March that his draft
was “right in every way,” he was shocked a day later to read a key change in the
law: The proposed vesting of all Japanese-Canadian-owned property in the hands
of the Custodian.43 As he interpreted the revisions, “all property of any sort in
39. Order 1665, supra note 30, s 12(1).
40. Ibid, s 12(3). Punishment for breach of any aspect of the Order or by-laws made
under it involved a five hundred dollar fine, up to twelve months of imprisonment,
or both. Ibid, s 15.
41. Read studied at Dalhousie, Columbia, and then Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He briefly
practised law before joining Dalhousie, where he specialized in property law. After the war,
Read would go on to a distinguished judicial career on the International Court of Justice.
On Read’s deanship during Dalhousie’s so-called “golden age,” see John Willis, A History of
Dalhousie Law School (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) at 93, 96-99.
42. John E Read to Ian Mackenzie (copied to F P Varcoe) (28 February 1942), Ottawa, LAC
(RG 25, vol 3005, file 3464-q-40).
43. Ian Mackenzie to John E Read (1 March 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG 25, vol 3005, file
3464-q-40); Note for the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs (2 March 1942),
Ottawa, LAC (RG 25, vol 3005, file 3464-q-40) [Note for Undersecretary]. We believe
that the promise of protection was inserted into the draft by the Deputy Minister of Justice,
Frederick Varcoe, or by someone working directly under his supervision in the Department
of Justice. Unfortunately, the records of this process have been significantly withheld from
research by LAC, in part on the basis of the view that the records contain “information
the disclosure of which would reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of
international affairs, the defence of Canada … or the detection, prevention or suppression
of subversive or hostile activities.” Security rationales continue to play perplexing and
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the protected areas is being taken away from the Japanese and handed over to
the Custodian.” In a memo to his supervisor, Undersecretary of State, External
Affairs, Norman Robertson, Read excoriated the version that ultimately became
law for “abandoning completely” the principle of “fairness.”44
Emphasizing that Japanese Canadians were British subjects, Read saw Order
1665 as a betrayal of good governance and natural justice. “It strips them of
every cent they may have in their pockets or in the banks,” Read wrote, “it takes
the clothes off their backs and removes the tools of their trade: fountain pens
from their pockets, books from their libraries; and hands them all over to the
tender mercies of the Custodian.”45 Read himself had drafted the provisions
that would tear Japanese Canadians from their communities in coastal British
Columbia. These, however, he justified as necessities of war. The confiscation
of property, he noted by contrast, had “nothing whatever to do with security.”46
Read’s advocacy for the property rights of Japanese Canadians also had a more
instrumental rationale. Although he criticized government excess in relation
to property, he accepted that “the scheme of evacuation,” as he called it, “is
based upon [the] ultimate absorption of at least a substantial part of [Japanese
Canadians] … outside of the protected areas.” Thus, he joined others like Ian
Mackenzie, in intending that most Japanese Canadians would never return to
British Columbia. In Read’s view, recklessness with respect to property would
“hamper absorption” because it deprived Japanese Canadians of the means to
re-establish themselves east of the Rocky Mountains.
Instead, Read advocated measures similar to the law that governed
Japanese-Canadian-owned fishing vessels (a scheme he had created). With respect
to fishing vessels, Read explained, “care was taken to establish a benevolent
trusteeship … to protect the interests of British subjects whose fishing vessels
were taken.”47 Indeed, Order 288, of January 1942, had explicitly acknowledged
that the owners of the vessels “though being of Japanese origin, are Canadian
citizens,” and had emphasized that their dispossession should have “due regard
to the equity of the Japanese Canadian owners.”48 The law created a committee,
headed by a judge and including a Japanese-Canadian member, whose explicit

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

disconcerting roles in this history.
Note for Undersecretary, ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC 1942-288 (13 January 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG2 A-1-a, vol 1744, file 2484G)
[emphasis added] [Order 288]. This may be one of the only instances in which the wartime
government referred in law to “Japanese Canadians.” Note for Undersecretary, supra note 43.
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mandate was to “make it possible for the present owners of detained vessels to
freely negotiate for charters, leases, or sales.”49 In practice, however, the freedom
of owners was severely constrained from the outset by the circumstances of their
uprooting, and, ultimately, the committee broke the law and forced the sale
of vessels.50 Still, in March 1942, Read criticized Order 1665 by pointing to
a precedent offering more explicit property protection, in contrast to a law in
which he saw “no element of trusteeship recognized, and no attempt to set up
machinery that would enable the property of these British subjects to be sold so
as to preserve and protect their interests.”51
Japanese Canadians also closely scrutinized the laws that would upend their
lives and threaten their property. The sole Japanese-Canadian newspaper permitted
to publish after the attack on Pearl Harbor, The New Canadian, diligently reported
on and sometimes challenged federal policy, even as government censors oversaw
the paper’s operation.52 Published under the editorial leadership of Thomas
Shoyama, the paper was, in the words of one reader at the time, “intoxicating
… [i]t brought young kids like me to our first contact with the bright young
Nisei minds. It filled us in with political background and news.”53 The paper’s
accomplishments were in significant measure attributable to Shoyama. Born in
Kamloops in 1916 and a 1938 graduate of the University of British Columbia,
Shoyama viewed The New Canadian as a “vehicle of our response” to government
policy, an opportunity, “in spite of the bonds of wartime censorship … to try to
voice a right and forceful demand for democratic justice.”54
49. Order 288, supra note 48 [emphasis added].
50. The illegality of these sales was later acknowledged by the federal government. Héritage
Project, “Japanese Fishing Vessels” (13 February 1948), online: <heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_c9434> at images 458-77. On the disposal of the fishing vessels,
see Masako Fukawa & Stanley Fukawa, Spirit of the Nikkei Fleet: BC’s Japanese Canadian
Fishermen (Madeira Park, BC: Harbour, 2009) ch 7; Sunahara, supra note 3, ch 2; Adachi,
supra note 2 at 228-29; Jordan Stanger-Ross, “Telling a Difficult Past: Kishizo Kimura’s
Memoir of Entanglement in Racist Policy” (2014) 181 BC Stud 39 at 40 [Stanger-Ross,
“Kishizo Kimura”].
51. Note for Undersecretary, supra note 43.
52. Except for a short time, when it was brought under full government control (21 April–27
June 1942), the paper maintained a critical editorial perspective. Adachi, supra note 3 at 233.
53. Frank Moritsugu, “My Love Affairs with The New Canadian,” The New Canadian
(31 May 1958) 8.
54. Shoyama went on to a distinguished postwar civil service career in the Saskatchewan and
federal governments. Gregory Marchildon, “Shoyama, Thomas Kunito (1916-2006)”
(2006), online: <esask.uregina.ca/entry/shoyama_thomas_kunito_1916-.html>. See also,
Tom Shoyama, “As I Remember a Bit of It,” The New Canadian (31 May 1958) 2. On the
censorship process, see Frank Moritsugu, “My Love Affairs with the New Canadian,” The
New Canadian (14 June 1958) 1.
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Government officials allowed The New Canadian to continue in part because
they regarded it as an effective propaganda tool, but Shoyama and his colleagues
managed to preserve the integrity of the paper even in the context of government
oversight. The editorial team continued to serve the community by carrying
announcements and human interest stories, detailing the experiences of Japanese
Americans, and selectively criticizing federal policies. Although editors could
not prevent the federal government from inserting policy statements and notices
directly into the paper, they found subtle ways to contextualize and criticize
such official announcements. In the first months of Canada’s war in the Pacific,
The New Canadian usually carried government statements on its back pages.
In many cases, the editors contrasted these back-page bulletins with front-page
journalistic articles. These articles distinguished the federal announcements
from journalism (government insertions were subjects of reportage, not acts of
reporting) and allowed the editors to emphasize facets of policy and law that
they saw as especially important. In doing so, they preserved the sense that the
newspaper was more than a mouthpiece for the government. If reading the paper
was an intoxicating experience, it was partly because of the opportunity to decode
subtle, multi-vocal explanations of law.
In the first weeks of March 1942, The New Canadian conveyed the federal
promise to protect Japanese-Canadian-owned property, but at the same time it
warned readers that Order 1665 should be regarded with caution. The 12 March
1942 edition was the first to report the Order, running a “Notice to Persons of
the Japanese Race,” penned by McPherson, the Deputy Custodian. Quoting the
law, “[a]s a protective measure only,” McPherson wrote, “all property situated in
any protected area of British Columbia belonging to any person of the Japanese
race” would be vested in the Custodian, who would charge “no commission”
for services in the “control and management” of property. Japanese Canadians
were “urged to report their property immediately instead of waiting until their
evacuation as this will enable the Custodian to take prompt action to protect
and administer the same.”55 McPherson’s announcement repeatedly echoed
the language of “protection,” a term that he explained in private government
communication as positioning the Custodian as a “Trustee.”56 “[I]nsofar as the
property of Japanese Evacuees is concerned,” McPherson would argue near the
55. GW McPherson, “Notice to Persons of the Japanese Race,” The New Canadian (12 March
1942) 4. This notice was also carried in mainstream Vancouver dailies. See e.g. Vancouver
News Herald (11 March 1942).
56. GW McPherson, “Appendix C, Memorandum by Counsel for the Custodian,” (30 July
1941), Ottawa, LAC (MG30-E148, vol 8, file 52).
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end of the war, “the Custodian is definitely holding such property, in trust, for
the former Japanese owners, and will be held strictly accountable to them.”57
Editors at The New Canadian expressed scepticism. A short front-page
article undermined the government’s official statement. McPherson’s notice, the
author explained, was “a paid newspaper announcement,” not journalism. The
article avoided use of the phrase “protective measure,” emphasizing instead the
wide discretionary power granted to the Custodian.58 Five days later, another
front-page article highlighted the relationship between the Custodian’s activity
and the disruption of Vancouver’s Powell Street neighbourhood. The Custodian
had established “miniature offices” in a previously bustling Japanese-Canadianowned restaurant, Fuji Chop Suey, where “booths formerly used for dining”
were equipped with typewriters and staff ready “to assist those anxious to report
their assets and liabilities” to the federal government. Once again, the newspaper
eschewed the language of protection, explaining that “[u]nder [Order 1665], the
Custodian has been authorized to take control of property,” subjecting it “to the
consolidated regulations on trading with the enemy” and authorizing its disposal
at “the direction of the federal government.”59 The issue also reprinted a biting
editorial from the non-Japanese-Canadian press, a rarity at this juncture of the
Pacific War, asking, “What is this anyway—Hitler’s country or a democracy?”60
An advertisement printed alongside this disconcerting comparison encouraged
Japanese Canadians to seek alternatives to the federal government for the
safekeeping of their property: “Your Household Goods Are Valuable” read an
advertisement for Campbell’s Storage Limited, “Have them carefully packed and
stored or shipped by trained professionals at very reasonable rates.”61 For readers
of The New Canadian in early March 1942, Campbell’s Storage may well have
seemed the more reliable promise of protection.
Federal officials knew that Japanese Canadians distrusted their policies,
including the promise to protect property. Many feared that disbelief might
57. McPherson to DesRosiers, “Re: Japanese Language Association School,” (14 July 1945),
Ottawa, LAC (RG117, vol 2535, file 58998).
58. “Make Application: Custodian to Take Control of Property of Evacuees,” The New Canadian
(12 March 1942) 1.
59. “Powell Offices Aid Report of Property to Custodian,” The New Canadian
(17 March 1942) 1.
60. “A Country Editor Views Evacuation,” The New Canadian (17 March 1942) 2.
On comparisons of Canada to Nazi Germany, see Jordan Stanger-Ross & The Landscapes of
Injustice Research Collective, “Nazism in Canada?: The Internment of Japanese Canadians
and the History of Comparison” in Helga Thorson, Charlotte Schallie & Andrea van Noord,
eds, Holocaust Education in a Time of Transition [under review].
61. “Your Household Goods are Valuable,” The New Canadian (17 March 1942) 2.
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encourage resistance to the internment process, a particular worry because public
calm on Canada’s Pacific coast was widely regarded as fragile.62 On 4 March 1942,
when Order 1665 created the BCSC, Taylor wrote to Mackenzie discouraging
actions or pronouncements that might further alienate Japanese Canadians. “[A]t
[the] moment we believe we have cooperation of [the] Japanese community,”
he remarked. However, “if … further restrictions be placed on [the] Japanese we
will lose present cooperation and create an element of distrust and complete lack
of confidence which will add tremendously to our present problem.”63 Quieting
unrest among Japanese Canadians would remain a preoccupation for Taylor
and the BCSC in the months that followed. In April, Taylor speculated that
the unchecked circulation of “fears” and “rumour” among Japanese Canadians
might eventually prompt sufficient defiance to require their mass imprisonment,
a prospect far more difficult and expensive than their confinement in sites of
internment.64 Central among the “rumours” of concern to Japanese Canadians
were hints that government policy might leave them destitute after the war. Such
impressions, many officials worried, could have spiralling consequences.
Distrust of the government posed additional practical problems for federal
officials. As a report by the Vancouver Office of the Custodian later reflected,
“the Japanese were obviously distrustful of the whole machinery set up …
and it shortly became quite clear that they were taking little advantage of
the facilities which were offered [to register their property].”65 This failure to
cooperate posed a problem for the office because the Custodian risked being
“charged with the administration and control of large quantities of property
of which he had no knowledge.”66 Ignorance of the property vesting in the
Custodian obstructed officials scrambling to respond to their mandate under
Order 1665. As they struggled to hire staff for a range of property management
tasks—assessing the condition and value of property, maintaining insurance,
making repairs, collecting rents, and paying creditors—they needed Japanese
Canadians to help them understand the extent of the property concerned and,
even better, to deliver property to government officials.67 The government would
62. Roy, Triumph of Citizenship, supra note 4 ch 1 at 20ff.
63. Austin C Taylor to Ian Mackenzie (4 March 1942), Ottawa, LAC (MG27 III-B5, vol 24,
file 67-25(1)).
64. Minutes of the British Columbia Security Commission (23 April 1942), Ottawa, LAC
(RG 36-27, vol 7, file 163).
65. Report to the Undersecretary of State Regarding the Japanese Evacuation Section of the
Office of the Custodian at Vancouver, BC (26 June 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 2).
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
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soon extend a more robust promise to protect property in hopes of securing
Japanese-Canadian cooperation.
B. STRENGTHENING THE PROMISE

Facing internment, Japanese Canadians could see the precarious position of their
property and they demanded its protection. Undersecretary of State Coleman68
realized that the promise of protection in Order 1665 was insufficient.
On 16 March he explained to the Departments of Justice and External Affairs
that “leaders in [the Japanese-Canadian] community” were “exercised” about the
property situation and indicated that the BCSC regarded this as a matter of
“importance and urgency.”69 He recommended an amendment to Order 1665,
which included “dropping completely” the offending clause, 12(3). “I do not
think,” wrote Coleman, “it was ever contemplated by the Government that they
would deprive the Japanese owners of their property or the proceeds thereof.”
The existing wording, however, left the law “susceptible of the interpretation
that something in the nature of confiscation is taking place and I am sure,”
he repeated, “this was not the intention of this Government.”70 Citing the necessity
to encourage Japanese Canadians to register their property with the Custodian,
and the “very heavy responsibilities” placed upon the BCSC, Coleman proposed
a rewording of the law.
The promise to protect emerged from a number of interests that, for the
moment, intersected. One thread, most clearly expressed by Read, drew together
a connection between the rights of British subjects, common law property rights,
and rights of natural justice. Normative concerns for fairness were bolstered,
however, by instrumental values that sought cooperation, administrative simplicity,
and cost effectiveness in the implementation of the racialized internment and
dispersal of Japanese Canadians. Coleman, for his part, made a pragmatic case.
68. Having served as part-time dean of the Manitoba Law School, Coleman left legal practice
in 1933 to take up a position in Ottawa. Considered an “urbane intellectual with a mania
for reading,” Coleman “was a quiet, cautious, rather formal man who put heavy emphasis
on form, precedent, and tradition. He never gave a swift judgement and seldom made
a quick decision.” R St J Macdonald, “An Historical Introduction to the Teaching of
International Law in Canada: Part III” (1976) 14 Can YB Int’l Law 224 at 227, n 153; Hugh
L Keenleyside, Memoirs of Hugh L Keenleyside: Volume 1: Hammer the Golden Day (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1981) at 485. On Coleman’s conservative views on legal education,
see W Wesley Pue, Lawyer’s Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 159-60, 209.
69. EH Coleman to Norman Robertson (16 March 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG 25, vol 3121,
file 4606-c-13-40).
70. Ibid.
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Japanese Canadians were “exercised” and their fears about the handling of their
property jeopardized the activities of both the BCSC and the Custodian. His
proposed amendments, which would take the form of Order 2483 on 27 March
1942, aimed to reassure Japanese Canadians and hence facilitate the work of the
uprooting. And yet, his argument also conveyed something of Read’s view that
confiscation would violate core principles of property rights.71 Coleman took
for granted, at least rhetorically, that the government would not confiscate the
property of British subjects. Almost a year later, Coleman and his supervisor, the
Secretary of State, described a contemplated new Order that would force the sale
of all Japanese-Canadian-owned property as a significant shift away from the
protection envisioned in Order 2483.72
Just over three weeks after Order 1665 became law, the cabinet amended it
with Order 2483.73 The preamble explained the reasons for the revisions, noting
“that it is desirable to provide that any plan with regard to the placement of
such persons be limited to making provision for the temporary placement only
of such persons during the continuation of the state of war now existing.” The
preamble also cited recommendations by the BCSC that “a greater degree of
protective control over persons of the Japanese race and the property of such
persons be provided for.” The substantive provisions stipulated the powers of the
Commission to include “the temporary placement only” of Japanese Canadians
“during the continuation of the state of war now existing.”74 Additionally, section
12 was amended to add the following:
12 (2) The Custodian may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Regulation,
order that all or any property whatsoever, situated in any protected area of British
Columbia, belonging to any person of the Japanese race shall, for the purpose of
protecting the interests of the owner or any other person, be vested in the Custodian,
and the Custodian shall have full power to administer such property for the benefit
of all such interested persons, and shall release such property upon being satisfied
that the interests aforesaid will not be prejudiced thereby.75
71. Positioning the protection of property as a premise of discussion, Coleman seemed to ascribe
to property the same foundational role explicated by Joseph Singer, who writes “[p]roperty
law defines things that we would like to take for granted; it does so by setting the boundaries
of just social relationships.” Joseph William Singer, “Democratic Estates: Property Law in a
Free and Democratic Society” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 1009 at 1062.
72. EH Coleman re: Real Estate owned by persons of the Japanese race evacuated from the
Defence Area of British Columbia (December 1942), Ottawa, LAC (MG 27 III-B5, vol
25, file 70-25c).
73. PC 1942-2483 (1942) Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1752, file 2531G) [See Appendix II].
74. Ibid, s 2 [emphasis added].
75. Ibid, s 4 [emphasis added].
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The Order continued to incorporate referentially the wide discretionary
power of the Custodian in relation to the “control and management”
of the property as found in the Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy.76
On the basis of Orders 1665 and 2483, the Custodian seized control of hundreds
of millions of dollars worth of property belonging to Japanese Canadians.77
In the wake of Order 2483, the federal government once again addressed
Japanese Canadians in The New Canadian. A lengthy statement by Austin
Taylor on 6 April 1942 sought to allay concerns, or, in his words, to counter
“baseless rumors being bandied about.”78 Promising the “true facts,” Taylor urged
readers to “PAY ATTENTION TO THEM AND NOTHING ELSE,” before
beginning his explanation of multiple facets of government policy. With respect
to property, he wrote:
A Custodian of (Alien) property has been appointed by the Government and charged
with the protection of all property placed voluntary [sic] under his control. This is
not confiscation and the Custodian will administer the property in the interests of
the people which should prevent them from disposing of their assets at a sacrifice
or in an unfavourable market. We mention this because there seems to be a lack of
under standing [sic] of the Custodian’s position.
We repeat that property delivered to the Custodian will be administered in the
interests of the Japanese evacuated … and such property will not be disposed of at
a sacrifice to pay … debts.
We feel it is in the interest of those evacuated to place their property under the
Custodian’s control, and if this is not done before leaving the Protected Area, the
Custodian cannot protect the property during the absence of any person evacuated.79

The statement mischaracterized the law on several points, both understating
and overstating the promise to protect. The Custodian’s responsibility for the
property of Japanese Canadians was not limited to that property registered with
its office, nor was the vesting of property voluntary. The promise was more
76. Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy, supra note 31. The regulations stipulated that
“[t]he Custodian may, where he considers it advisable to do so, liquidate any enemy property
vested in him.” Ibid, s 38. See also, sections 39 and 40(1) which allowed for any “notice,
conveyance, transfer or release as he may think proper,” and granted the authority to “dispose
of any property, right or interest at such time and place and to such person or persons and
upon such terms and in such manner, whether publicly or privately, as he in his discretion
shall think proper.”
77. Value expressed in current dollars.
78. Austin C Taylor, “Roads, Ont Mills, Beet Fields, Interior Towns,” The New Canadian
(6 April 1942) 3.
79. Ibid.
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encompassing than advertised. On the other hand, the promise of protection did
not prevent sales for the purpose of paying debts owed by Japanese Canadians.
On the contrary, the equity of creditors was explicitly guaranteed in Order 2483.
However, the notice did repeat three times that the Custodian served the interests
of Japanese-Canadian property-owners. Taylor’s statement unambiguously relayed
the most substantive and important facet of the amended order in council: The
position of the Custodian as a trustee.
As it had with Order 1665, The New Canadian contextualized Taylor’s
announcement with an article of its own. While the front-page story, “Custodian
to Act for Evacuated People” carried Taylor’s statement, the article that followed
questioned the reliability of that assurance in the absence of specifics. Quoting the
essential message of Order 2483—“Property delivered to the Custodian will be
administered in the interests of the Japanese Evacuated”—the article nonetheless
articulated grounds for misgivings. “Confusion thus far has arisen over the fact that
the administrative policy of the Custodian has not yet been defined,” the article
pointed out; “he is thus unable to answer many details which arise in the disposing
of various kinds of property.”80 Shoyama and his colleagues knew, just as Read
did, that the devil was in the details. On 15 April, The New Canadian announced
that Japanese-Canadian organizations would press the federal government for
answers to “many questions of basic importance,” including “losses and damage
to property arising out of the evacuation program.”81 Responses would not be
forthcoming. The federal government never took responsibility for such losses,
later using them disingenuously to justify the forced sales of the property they
had promised to protect and return.
As would become evident in the Nakashima case, the Orders that constituted
the dispossession created a cross-weave of conflicting powers and responsibilities.
Aspects of the orders suggest essentially unlimited governmental power over
all Japanese-Canadian-owned property, including the power to dispose of the
property for any reason. Reference to the Regulations Respecting Trading with the
Enemy also indicated a pervasive tendency to conflate Japanese Canadians with
the country of Japan and to cast loyal Canadians of Japanese descent as enemies.
But the wide powers of disposal and racist framing must be considered alongside
provisions that created a legal trust. Beginning with the notion that property
was being held in “custody,” without charging administrative fees, the orders
overlaid the vesting of Japanese-Canadian-owned property in the Custodian
with a legally significant purpose: “[A]s a protective measure only.” Order 2483
80. “Custodian to Act for Evacuated People,” The New Canadian (6 April 1942) 1.
81. “Ask Details of Custodian Policy,” The New Canadian (15 April 1942) 1.
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further stipulated that property was to be held for the “benefit” of “interested
persons” (earlier defined as “the owner or any other person”—presumably family
members and creditors without title). Moreover, given that the orders granted
only the “temporary” power to remove and intern Japanese Canadians, the orders
assumed that property would be returned to original owners at the conclusion
of “the state of war now existing.” Read together, and in sequence, the orders
circumscribed the Custodian’s powers over Japanese-Canadian-owned property
with deliberate limits. Without saying so expressly, Order 1665 as amended by
Order 2483 created a legal trust.
C. UNDERMINING THE PROMISE

In the months that followed, property owners concerned about the
implementation of the orders of dispossession would find no answers in the pages
of The New Canadian. On 21 April 1942, the BCSC announced that it had
taken control of the newspaper, which, they explained, was to convey only “the
truth about measures being taken.”82 Rebranded as the “recognized organ for the
dissemination of official information,” the paper was to be distributed free to all
Japanese Canadians. Commissioners hoped privately that these measures would
dispel “fears being created … by the spread of unfounded rumour.”83 In May and
June 1942, the paper fell almost silent on the topic of property, even as significant
assets were sold without the consent of their owners, including fishing vessels
and automobiles.84 In these months, the only hint that the property of Japanese
Canadians still hung in the balance came in the form of classified advertisements
from those seeking to benefit from Japanese-Canadian losses: A “refined” elderly
woman sought to rent a home in suburban Vancouver and hoped that a displaced
Japanese Canadian might offer an affordable option, a store promised to pay
“highest cash prices” for Japanese-Canadian-owned furniture, and two clinics
offered to painlessly “destroy” the household pets of Japanese Canadians forced
to internment.85
82. “An Editorial Message from the BC Security Commission,” The New Canadian
(21 April 1942) 2.
83. Ibid. See also, the Minutes of the British Columbia Security Commission, supra note 74.
84. During this period, the Japanese Fishing Vessel Disposal Committee commenced forced sales
and the Custodian transferred automobiles without consent to federal departments.
See Adachi, supra note 2 at 229, 233; Stanger-Ross, “Kishizo Kimura,” supra note 50 at
39-42; “Army to Absorb Japanese Cars,” The Vancouver Province (2 June 1942).
85. “Classified Ads,” The New Canadian (6 May 1942) 2; “List your House for Rent,” The New
Canadian (20 May 1942) 3; “Classified Ads,” The New Canadian (23 May 1942) 3; “Pets
May Be Destroyed Painlessly at Clinic,” The New Canadian (27 May 1942) 3.
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In these crucial months of the uprooting, The New Canadian never
questioned the government’s policy. The promise of Order 2483—to administer
the property of Japanese Canadians in their interest and to return it—had been
stated, but its mechanisms had never been adequately explained. When Shoyama
and his editorial team re-assumed control of the paper in early summer 1942, the
question of property quickly returned to the headlines. However, by this time
the promise of protection seemed perhaps a distant past as Japanese Canadians
struggled to grapple with the uprooting of the entire population as well as the
Custodian’s neglect, and in some cases sale, of their property.86
During the summer and fall of 1942, federal officials began to contemplate
a breach of the legal trust and a betrayal of the promise to protect. Officials
in the Custodian’s office faced mounting pressure to sell Japanese-Canadianowned farms (from staff of the Soldier Settlement Board, which wanted them
for veterans) and urban properties (particularly in the City of Vancouver, where
officials contemplated a redevelopment of the largest prewar Japanese-Canadian
neighbourhood). As the Custodian’s office considered these proposals, they began
to discuss the sale of all Japanese-Canadian-owned property, including real estate
and personal belongings. These communications continued to focus on pragmatic
concerns. McPherson in particular came to see sale as the most feasible solution
to the problems of property management. At the same time, the sales would allay
concerns about costs of the internment, since the funds realized in the sale of the
property would be credited to the Japanese-Canadian property-owners and put
towards the costs of maintaining internment.87 By leaving Japanese Canadians
with virtually nothing in British Columbia, the forced sales also advanced
the aim, shared by almost all officials (even advocates of robust trusteeship),
to permanently disperse Japanese Canadians from the province. In a letter to
the Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of State McLarty (a former
lawyer as well), conveyed the policy consensus that, “[t]he situation in British
Columbia concerning both urban and farm properties of Japanese who have been
evacuated is exceeding difficult.” “[I]t was the unanimous view of the members
of Council who looked into the problem,” he wrote, “that it would probably be
86. “Control Farm Land Sale, Lease,” The New Canadian (8 July 1942) 1; “Berry Crop
One-Quarter of Normal; Weeds Over-run Many Farms,” The New Canadian (11 July 1942)
1; “Confiscated Cars Offered For Sale; Custodian to Credit Former Owners,” The New
Canadian (18 July 1942) 1; “Fish Boat Committee to Wind Up July 31,” The New Canadian
(22 July 1942) 1; “Custodian Not Selling Real Estate Left Behind by Evacuated Owners,”
The New Canadian (2 September 1942) 1.
87. Stanger-Ross & LIRC, “Suspect Properties,” supra note 6 at 272. See also, Sunahara,
supra note 3, ch 5.
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necessary to take steps to liquidate, with appropriate safeguards for the protection
of the interests of the owners of the Japanese race.”88 In effect, the government
decided that all Japanese-Canadian-owned property remaining in the “protected
area” would be sold.
On 19 January 1943, the Government announced in Order 469 that “the
evacuation of persons of the Japanese race from the protected areas has now been
substantially completed and that it is necessary to provide facilities for liquidation
of property in appropriate cases.”89 “Wherever,” Order 469 stated,
under Orders in Council … the Custodian has been vested with the power and
responsibility of controlling and managing any property of persons of the Japanese
race evacuated from the protected areas, such power and responsibility shall
be deemed to include and to have included from the date of the vesting of such
property in the Custodian, the power to liquidate, sell, or otherwise dispose of such
property.90

Sales of the real property of Japanese Canadians began in the spring of 1943.
Within the year, the Custodian had sold the majority of Japanese-Canadian-owned
property, although periodic sales continued for more than six years thereafter.91
Despite the fact that Order 469 reiterated that the Custodian’s power of
“management and control” included the authority to sell, that power had always
been present as long as the Custodian acted according to the terms of the trust:
Namely, selling property only if such sales were for the protective benefit of
Japanese-Canadian owners, and if the property could not be returned at the
conclusion of the war. The power to sell was always qualified by a legal promise to
protect the owners’ interest in their property. The government’s promise to protect
was all the more important since the government had created the conditions
that made the protection necessary in the first place; it was the uprooting that
emptied houses, abandoned vehicles in driveways, and left household possessions
the target of looters and thieves.92 It was the demands of Japanese Canadians, and
88. Norman McLarty to Louis St. Laurent (15 January 1943), Ottawa, LAC (RG13 vol
2819, file 144935).
89. PC 1943-469 (1943), Ottawa, LAC (RG2-A-1-a, vol 1789, file 2710G) [See Appendix III].
90. Ibid.
91. The final sale of a parcel of real estate in Vancouver’s Japanese-Canadian neighbourhood
surrounding Powell Street occurred on 9 January 1950. See the Landscapes of Injustice Real
Estate Database.
92. In this sense the promise and its breach can be considered in comparison with other contexts
in which the Canadian state placed people at great disadvantage while simultaneously and
paternalistically purporting concern for their interests. See Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie
Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1990). See also, Tina Loo, “Africville and the Dynamics of State Power in Postwar Canada”
(2010) 39:2 Acadiensis 23.
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the threats of their resistance, in addition to internal concerns about property
rights and natural justice, that led to the promise to protect.
Even as officials settled on a policy of forced sales, the notion of government
trusteeship lingered. They described the sales as benefitting Japanese-Canadian
owners, claiming that urban properties were amassing debts, farms were
being mishandled by tenants, and chattels were going to waste in government
warehouses. Under these conditions, officials argued that forced sales benefited
owners: Better to hold equity in cash, the argument went, than in diminishing
assets. Few Japanese Canadians would agree, particularly given the prices for
which the Custodian sold their property and the requirement that those living in
government camps exhaust their equity in order to pay for their own incarceration.
Further, the records of government contradict the argument that the sales served
the interests of owners. Virtually all Japanese-Canadian-owned urban properties
were rented, generating sufficient income to cover the costs of their maintenance.
The farm properties were in intense demand and rapidly increasing in value.
The government could have done far more to protect chattels.93 Nonetheless,
even as officials turned toward the forced sale of everything that Japanese
Canadians owned, they preserved the language of interest and the logic of trust,
if disingenuously, that had been established by the promise to protect. Ironically,
both the undermining and preservation of the trust combined to support the
forced sales. The notion of a trust allowed officials to reason that it was in the
best interests of Japanese-Canadian owners for the Custodian to sell—a rationale
enabled by the failure of the Custodian to honour the obligation to protect the
property in the first place.
The editors of The New Canadian saw the forced sales as a breach of trust,
a violation of basic civil norms, and a betrayal that would undermine the loyalty
of Canadian citizens. A powerful editorial on 20 February 1943 portrayed the
new powers as a direct threat to the promise to protect. Calling on the federal
government to issue a clear statement to “bolster” Japanese-Canadian “belief in
a democratic government,” the editors described Order 469 as a “great shock
and disappointment” to property owners who “were content to leave control
of their property to the Custodian, because of the implied assurance that the
93. Telegram to McPherson (4 January 1943), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 2536, file 59008, part
1.1); Real Estate Agents Cash Journal (December 1942), Ottawa, LAC (RG 117, vol 69);
Ivan Barnet to Gordon Murchison (28 March 1943), Ottawa, LAC (RG 38, vol 403, file
V-8-10, part 3); Héritage Project, “Annual Report of the Vancouver Office of the Custodian
(1943)” (28 January 1944), online: <heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c9469>
at images 218-42.
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Federal Government was taking over ‘as a protective measure only.’” Explicitly
tying ownership in land to citizenship, the editors argued:
[I]t is safe to declare here and now, that those who invested their earnings in assets
as solid as good Canadian soil thereby gave notice of their wish and intention to
remain in Canada as good Canadian citizens. There is assuredly no reason today why
any policy needs to be carried out in a way that weakens, rather than strengthens
that wish.94

“The common feeling among property-owners,” they continued, “was ... that
no matter how their cash and other assets might dwindle and vanish during the
war, they were assured at least of a house or a piece of land which might see
them through the uncertain period after the war.” Now this security was lost
and, as many Japanese Canadians correctly anticipated, their equity in real estate
would “dwindle and vanish” along with the other cherished and quotidian assets
of their lives.
In the same issue, The New Canadian reprinted an article from The Vancouver
Daily Province attempting to reassure readers that the promise of protection had
not been abandoned. Frank Shears, who managed the Vancouver office of the
Custodian, told the Vancouver paper: “A lot of people are assuming that because
the property may be sold the Japanese will not come back.” Despite allowing this
possibility, he explained that “it could also mean that the Dominion Government
prefers to have the property held for them in cash.”95 While Shears equivocated
on the intention of the policy, property, in his formulation was still “held
for them”—the power to sell was commensurate with the duty of the federal
government to hold property for the benefit of owners. Indeed, according to the
Daily Province, “[s]hould the Japanese be allowed to return here it may be in the
better interest of both the government and the Japanese to hand them a cash sum
rather than return their property.”96 Japanese Canadians, according to the logic of
the federal government, were best served by a policy of forced sale.
That argument failed to convince Japanese Canadians. It also failed to
persuade Henry Forbes Angus, a prominent official in External Affairs. In a memo
to Norman Robertson on 15 March 1943, Angus forcefully objected to the
turn in policy, which, in his view, would “legalize acts of gross injustice and
oppression.” In complying with their internment, Angus argued, many citizens
94. “A Statement is in Order,” The New Canadian (20 February 1943) 2.
95. “Government Prefers Money: Selling of Japanese Property Does Not Mean Japs Banned,” The
Vancouver Daily Province (11 February 1943).
96. “Japanese Property Sale Does Not Mean Ban from BC After War,” The New Canadian
(20 February 1943) 1.
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of “unimpeachable character” had already “been called on to make very great
sacrifices in the interests of public security.” These policies had brought grievous
harm to the economic well-being of Japanese Canadians. “Through no fault of
his own,” Angus wrote, the Japanese-Canadian citizen “has been deprived of the
major part of his earning power, has been removed from his home, has seen his
children’s educational opportunities gravely impaired.” The new policy would
mean that “[he] finds himself in a position in which he may be substantially
forced to use the proceeds of the enforced liquidation of his capital assets to
meet what would for citizens of other races would be considered normal living
expenses.” Angus raised a number of legal objections to the policy: It exceeded
the necessity of war, trespassed provincial jurisdiction, contravened the previous
word of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, and violated the Atlantic
Charter. He portrayed it as a breach of “British tradition” that encouraged the
“belief among responsible citizens that the Canadian Government is emulating
the Nurnberg decrees.”97
Japanese Canadians objected with even greater force and clarity. Hundreds
wrote in protest when notified of the sale of their property without consent.
Many among them referenced the promise of protection that had been betrayed.
When Hanjiro Yoshijima was informed in July 1943 that his property in New
Westminster had been rented for what he viewed as an astonishingly low figure,
he wrote the Office of the Custodian in “shock”: “We had believed,” he wrote
“that the custodian was to protect and administer our property … in a way
in which the owner would have done himself and had trusted you to handle
our affairs as sanely and as sensible as possible in our interest.”98 The language
of protection and administration, of the “interest” of the owner, suggests that
Yoshijima knew Order 2483 and saw it as committing the government to act in
his interest. He was to be disappointed. Almost two years later, when officials
sold his property without his consent, he wrote again, but without faith that the
government could be held to its word: “Perhaps it is useless to inform you now,
but, all the prices listed [for his property] are outrageous and believe me, there is
not a single article that was sold for even a quarter of its real value.”99
97. Henry Angus to Robertson (15 March 1943), Ottawa, LAC (RG 25, vol 3121, file
c-4606-13-40). The correct spelling in German would be “Nürnberg” or “Nuernberg.”
Angus, a long-time University of British Columbia sociology and political science professor,
and a former member of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, served during the war as an assistant
to the Canadian Prime Minister.
98. Héritage Project, “Hanjiro Yoshijima to Office of the Custodian” (21 July 1943), online:
<heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c9476> at image 1332.
99. Ibid at image 1594.
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Others wrote the federal government to express similar views of a promise
breached. “I never thought,” wrote Tokujiro Takenaka, “that the trustworthy
custodian will dispose of my property at such a cheap price.”100 Aya Suzuki
remembered, “before leaving Vancouver your men told us that this process was
to protect us and in your assurance we had our businesses put into our local
agents whom we trusted as you had promised … [b]ut now you say according
to Ottawa this land has been sold.” She forcefully objected to this reversal,
accusing authorities of an unforgivable breach of the rights of citizens.101 Macer
Okamoto wrote in disbelief that his family’s belongs were slated for forced sale:
“[S]urely,” he wrote, “there must have be a terrible mistake somewhere! …
We had everyfaith [sic] that it was for our protection when we handed everything
to the Custodian for safe keeping [sic]. Otherwise we would have sold some of the
things on our own as many were doing.”102 Toyo Takahashi, in a letter protesting
the sale of her home in Victoria, described it as “against your promises, and
my wishes, furthermore it is utterly undeserved.”103 Many Japanese Canadians,
seeing few other options, had placed their trust in the federal government’s
repeated promise to protect their property. When the federal government sold all
Japanese-Canadian-owned property under Order 469, letters of protest conveyed
the bitterness, disappointment, and regret of a broken trust.

II. LITIGATING THE PROMISE: NAKASHIMA V CANADA
Between the passage of Order 469 and the start of property sales in the spring
of 1943, leaders in the Japanese-Canadian community repeatedly sought
clarification and assurance from the federal government concerning the fate of
their property. Tempering their outrage at the prospect of sale was a continuing
faith in the Custodian’s trusteeship and rumours that rented properties would
not be sold.104 By early April 1943, however, The New Canadian reported that
the “[l]atest developments seem to dispel this impression”; all property would
be sold regardless of rental status.105 Still, the newspaper found cause for faint
100.
101.
102.
103.

Ibid at image 1333.
Ibid at image 1334.
Ibid at image 1335.
Ibid at image 1339. For dozens of other letters expressing similar sentiments, see Office of
the Custodian of Enemy Property, Vancouver Office Files, Microfilm Reel C9476, online:
<heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c9476>. See also Stanger-Ross, Blomley & the
Landscapes of Injustice Research Collective, supra note 7.
104. “Legal Opinion Disposal Beyond Governm’t Power,” The New Canadian (3 April 1943) 1.
105. Ibid.
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hope, noting that the government had emphasized that “the whole purpose of
the custodian’s taking over the property … is in order that it may be properly
protected.”106 Despite the dire circumstances in which they had been forced to
live, Japanese Canadians organized to hold the government to its promise. In April
1943, The New Canadian announced that “[n]umbers of former residents of the
coastal district in the Slocan, New Denver and Kaslo [sites of internment] have
voiced their wish to organize as an amalgamated ‘property-owners’ association’ in
order to carry the fight to the courts of law.” Calling for the establishment of local
committees of concerned property owners, editors predicted “that the litigation is
likely to be long, involved and costly.”107 They were right.
At Kaslo, under the chairmanship of Dr. Kozo Shimotakahara, the “well
known pioneer physician,” the Amalgamated Property Owners’ Association
(APOA) began to organize its litigation strategy.108 Seeking to challenge “the
constitutional power of the government even in war time to order liquidation
of evacuee-owned property,” the committee called upon all “[r]eal property
owners anxious to retain their interest in their homes, land and buildings”
to defray the anticipated legal costs of $8,500.109 “It is not known as yet,” the
article admitted, “whether goods, chattels, and personal property falls within the
provisions of the order or the policy to be adopted by the Custodian,” but, if so,
all Japanese Canadians would be enmeshed “in an issue fundamental and basic
to Canadian democracy as the right to hold property clearly is.”110 Subsequent
articles suggested that all property owners should contribute to the legal fund,
setting contributions at “ten per cent of the annual taxation paid upon their
property,”111 while reinforcing the argument that what was at stake involved “the
safeguarding of fundamental” and “democratic rights.”112 By the end of May
1943, small amounts of money collected from Japanese Canadians, in mostly
desperate circumstances enabled the APOA to retain the Vancouver law firm of
Norris and MacLennan. The appearance of legal counsel setting out the route by
which the Orders might be legally challenged offered some solace from what was
106.
107.
108.
109.

Ibid.
Ibid.
“United Action of Evacuees Sought to Aid Test Case,” The New Canadian (10 April 1943) 1.
“Test Case Receiving Support From Evacuees Across Canada,” The New Canadian
(17 April 1943) 1.
110. Ibid.
111. “Launch Fund Campaign – Ten Per Cent of Taxes Asked,” The New Canadian
(1 May 1943) 1.
112. “Property Sale Cases Studies By Dominion Wide Organizations Occidentals Send
Contributions,” The New Canadian (8 May 1943) 1.
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otherwise a week of bad news: McPherson had announced that the Custodian’s
office had prepared a catalogue of all Japanese-Canadian-owned property for
listing and that sales were imminent.113
Thomas Grantham Norris and J. Arthur MacLennan had joined as partners
in legal practice in the late 1930s. Norris, the senior partner, had been called to
the British Columbia Bar in 1919 after distinguished military service in the First
World War.114 Norris’s legal career had included stints in Vernon and Kelowna
and, for a short while, as Solicitor for the Soldier Settlement Board. As a lawyer,
Norris engaged in a wide ranging practice and was regarded among his peers as a
tough-minded, “openly declared law and order” lawyer.115 It is unclear how Norris
came to represent members of the Japanese-Canadian community, although we
know that by the mid-1930s Norris had begun to represent Eikichi Kagetsu,
owner of a highly successful lumber business.116 By the outbreak of war, Norris’s
firm was widely known for its advocacy on behalf of Japanese Canadians, “at a
time when few would do anything for them.”117 In filling out their declarations
of property in the lead-up to the internment, many Japanese Canadians turned
to Norris and MacLennan for assistance. Norris’s firm was the obvious choice for
the APOA, although not Norris himself. Having agreed to serve as Deputy Judge
Advocate General for the Twenty-First Army Group for the duration of the war,
Norris had handed his practice over to his junior partner, Art MacLennan.118
With Norris returning to military service in 1941, MacLennan found himself
handling Norris’s clients, including the challenge to the constitutionality of the
sale of Japanese-Canadian-owned property.
The case against the government on behalf of Japanese-Canadian
property-owners posed a number of substantive and procedural difficulties.
The first issue concerned the nature of the suit itself. Still protected by medieval
theories of Crown immunity, the Crown could not be sued without its consent.119
113. “Property Sale to Begin This Week Warns Custodian,” The New Canadian (29 May 1943) 1.
114. GS Cumming, “Nos Disparus: The Honourable Thomas Grantham Norris, MC, QC”
(1977) 35:1 The Advocate 69 at 69. Norris would go on to serve as President of the
Vancouver Bar Association, a Bencher and then Treasurer of the British Columbia Law
Society, and, in 1959, on the bench of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
115. Ibid.
116. Thomas Norris Fonds, UBC_RBSC, box 13 (file 13-1) and box 31 (file 31-17).
117. Cumming, supra note 114 at 70.
118. ATC, supra note 1 at 124.
119. Petition of Right Act 1876, SC 1876, c 27. See also, Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan &
Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 4-5, 8. As the
authors explain, “the reason why the King could not be sued in the royal courts was the
feudal principle that a lord could not be sued in his own court.”
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Likewise, the Trading with the Enemy Regulations stipulated that the Custodian
could not be sued without his consent.120 Finally, as MacLennan pointed out in
an opinion letter to his clients, a reference case concerning the constitutionality of
the orders of dispossession would require the cooperation of either the provincial
or federal government.121 In other words, either the Custodian or Cabinet would
be required to give consent before the lawsuit could even begin.
The case also raised a number of substantive obstacles. The Canadian
judiciary had shown consistent deference to government action throughout the
war, and the widespread racist animosity towards Japanese Canadians would not
have inspired confidence about a different outcome in this particular case.122 And
yet, as some lawyers plainly saw, the injustice of the forced sale, the severity of
its consequences, its affront to notions of fairness and citizenship, the absence of
any logical security rationale, and, perhaps above all, the promises of protection
in the form of a legal trust made this a case worth fighting. On 1 June 1943, the
APOA instructed MacLennan to initiate a Petition of Right in the Exchequer
Court of Canada seeking an injunction against property sales and challenging
the constitutional validity of orders that “[cast] aside the rights of a citizen under
conditions not related to the efficient prosecution of the war.”123 “In the past
half century of our somewhat troubled life on the coast,” editors of The New
Canadian wrote,
we have had numerous instances of test cases, in the highest courts, in the legislative
buildings, in the local community halls. We cannot say that they met with success,
but when we look back in the years to come, perhaps these cases will be the
milestones that will mark our long and rocky road to citizenship.124

120. Supra note 31, s 27.
121. “Property Sale to Begin This Week Warns Custodian,” The New Canadian (29 May 1943) 1.
122. For wartime deference to government action under the DOCR, see Yasny v Lapointe, [1940]
48 Man R 56, 3 DLR 204 (Man CA); R v Stewart, [1940] OR 178, 1 DLR 689 (Ont CA);
R v Burt, [1941] OR 35, 1 DLR 598 (Ont SC); R v Ravenor [1941] 1 WWR 191, 75 CCC
294 (BC Co Ct); R v Cooper, [1941] 2 WWR 206, 76 CCC 277 (BCSC). As the Ontario
Supreme Court put it in Ex parte Sullivan, “[w]ar could not be carried on according to the
principles of Magna Carta.” [1941] OR 417 at para 16, 1 DLR 676 (Ont CA). See also, Eric
M Adams, “Fighting for Freedom” in The Idea of Constitutional Rights and the Transformation
of Canadian Constitutional Law, 1930-1960 (SJD Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of
Law, 2009) [unpublished].
123. “Property Owners Give Go-Ahead Signal for Action,” The New Canadian (5 June 1943) 1.
124. “Our Fights for Justice,” The New Canadian (12 June 1943) 2.
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Vindication did not seem imminent. One week after the editorial,
the Custodian listed hundreds of parcels of Japanese-Canadian-owned real
estate for sale.
MacLennan drafted three Petitions of Right dated 19 July 1943. They were
filed with the Exchequer Court in October of the same year. To challenge the
orders in their application to all Japanese Canadians, the APOA put forward three
categories of litigants: Eikichi Nakashima, a naturalized British subject; Tadao
Wakabayashi, a British subject by Canadian birth; and Jitaro and Takejiro Tanaka,
Japanese nationals resident in Canada.125 Before the internment, Nakashima had
worked as a fish buyer for BC Packers Co and lived in the Powell Street District
of Vancouver (688 E Cordova St.) with his wife and eleven-year-old son, Shinji.
Nakashima and his family had registered their property with the Custodian in
April 1942, before the government interned them at Lemon Creek in September.
Wakabayashi, a Nisei, had been born in Vancouver and had made his living as a
truck driver. Along with his wife, Akiko, Tadao had lived at 2456 McGill Street
in Vancouver before being forced from his home. In addition to his residential
property, Tadao and Akiko listed “53 Pieces Japanese Dishes” and one “pair ice
skates” among the extensive list of personal property seized by the Custodian.
The third set of litigants comprised brothers born in Japan, Jitaro and Takejiro
Tanaka. The brothers were joint tenants of 162 E 5th Street in Vancouver.
A Manager at the West Coast Trading Company before the internment, Takejiro
lived with his wife Ayako, and four children under the age of 10. Listing his
possessions for the Custodian he included three five-dollar war savings certificates
in the names of his children.126
Although the personal details in the opening paragraphs of each Petition
of Right differed, the balance of the claim was common to all. Disputing the
authority of the Custodian to “sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of the said
property against the wishes and desires of the Suppliant,” the Petition cited Orders
1665 and 2483 to assert that the Custodian acquired Japanese-Canadian-owned
property “upon Trust requiring him to hold same in Trust for the protection of
125. At the start of the war, approximately 23,000 of the total population of 25,000 Japanese
Canadians lived in British Columbia. Of British Columbia’s population of Canadians of
Japanese descent, approximately 7,200 were Japanese nationals, 2,400 were naturalized
Canadians, and 13,400 were Canadian by birth. HF Angus, “The Effect of the War on
Oriental Minorities in Canada” (1941) 7:4 Can J Econ Poli Sci 506 at 506. Until the passage
of the Canadian Citizenship Act created the legal status of Canadian citizenship in 1946,
Canadians had status as British subjects and naturalized Canadians under the Naturalization
Act, RSC 1927, c 138 and Canadian Nationals Act, RSC 1927, c 21.
126. Nakashima case file, Ottawa, LAC (R14188, vol 2186, file 20087, 20088, 20089).

Adams, Stanger-Ross, Promises of Law 719

the Suppliant and under his management and control upon a condition requiring
the Custodian to return to the Suppliant the said property… upon expiration
of the existing war”.127 In the alternative, the Petition alleged that the orders,
individually or collectively, were beyond the powers allocated by the WMA and
therefore unconstitutional. As to a remedy, the Petition sought a declaration of
constitutional invalidity, a declaration that the Custodian was a trustee of the
dispossessed Japanese-Canadian property-owners, and an injunction restraining
the sale of the property of Japanese Canadians.128 As the Custodian initiated
property sales, the litigants, MacLennan, and the broader Japanese-Canadian
community waited for the government’s permission to sue.
Permission of the Secretary of State arrived in October 1943, triggering
the Crown’s duty to produce a Statement of Defence but introducing another
procedural difficulty: The location of the trial. MacLennan explained to his clients
that the trial could be held in Vancouver, but that would require the government
to send one of the two judges on the Ottawa-based Exchequer Court to hold a
special session on the West Coast. Failing that, the case would have to be heard
in Ottawa and, in that instance, not until the following September, at which
point most of the property might have been sold.129 In response, MacLennan
dispatched lawyer F. Drewe Pratt to Ottawa to inquire about expediting a hearing
in Vancouver, while the APOA requested that the Custodian cease all property
sales until the legal matter had been resolved. Neither effort succeeded.130 Periodic
reports in The New Canadian speculated about when the case might finally be
heard. “Auctioning of goods and chattels has also been proceeding steadily,”
the paper reported “from warehouses, private homes and stores in which the
goods were kept.”131
Finally, word arrived that the case would be heard at the end of May 1944.
“[T]he long delay,” MacLennan explained, “had been caused by the pressure
of duties of Department of Justice officials entrusted with the handling of the
case.”132 Indeed, the litigation had attracted the attention of the highest officials
127. Petition of Right, filed 13 October 1943, ibid.
128. The New Canadian continued its coverage of the case, including quoting the legal arguments
drawn from the Petitions of Right at length for its readers. See “Japanese Property Bids Very
Slow: Case Likely to be Held in Vancouver September,” The New Canadian (31 July 1943) 1.
129. “Property Owners Win Right to Sue Ottawa in Exchequer Court,” The New Canadian (23
October 1943) 1.
130. “Visits Ottawa to Ask Haste in Property Case,” The New Canadian (27 November 1943) 1;
“Property Owners Review Situation,” The New Canadian (18 December 1943) 1.
131. “No Official Word on Exchequer Case,” The New Canadian (8 April 1944) 1.
132. “Court to Rule If Sale of Property is Constitutional,” The New Canadian (13 May 1944) 1.
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in the Department of Justice. The case would be defended by the Deputy Minister
of Justice himself, Frederick Percy Varcoe, along with David W. Mundell, who
would go on to a famed career as a government constitutional lawyer in his own
right. Varcoe began his career in the Department of Justice during the First
World War as an expert in the operation of the Military Service Act.133 Rising to
the position of Deputy Minister in 1941, Varcoe knew each of the orders at issue
having overviewed their drafting from his chair at the Department of Justice.
On the morning of 29 May 1944, after dining at the Chateau Laurier the night
before, MacLennan along with Nakashima, Wakabayashi, and Tanaka (having
received government permission to leave their sites of internment to attend their
hearing), appeared in the grey stone gothic court house near Parliament Hill. Back
in British Columbia, the editors at The New Canadian recognized that “delay has
served to increase suspicion that Justice may be conveniently blinded to suit the
purpose of the Government,” but counselled all the same that “[w]e must pledge
in this, our responsibility, every resource at our command, to defend rights which
never before have been so violated in a democratic country.”134 Reporting for
The New Canadian directly from the courthouse was Kunio Hidaka, a graduate
student at Queen’s University.135
Hidaka, the litigants, and the gowned lawyers—MacLennan, Varcoe, and
Mundell—rose for the arrival in court of Justice Joseph Thorarinn Thorson.
Varcoe knew the presiding judge well. Thorson had been Dean at the Manitoba
Law School before entering public life as a Liberal Member of Parliament,
first in Winnipeg, and then in Selkirk, Manitoba. In 1941, Mackenzie King

133. “Frederick P Varcoe: Lawyer Headed Department,” The Globe and Mail (16
October 1965) 46.
134. “To The Highest Court,” The New Canadian (20 May 1944) 2. See also, “Broad
Constitutional Rights at Stake In Court Battle Against Forced Sale,” The New Canadian
(27 May 1944) 1.
135. Kunio Hidaka, “Pro and Con on Property Rights,” The New Canadian (10 June 1944)
7. Hidaka, a graduate of the University of British Columbia, was no stranger to legalized
racism. At UBC, he compiled a list of racist legislative instruments targeting Japanese
Canadians. He would go on to play an important role in the Redress movement. See Roy
Miki, Redress: Inside the Japanese Canadian Call for Justice (Vancouver: Raincoast Books,
2004) at 16-18.
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appointed Thorson Minister of National War Service.136 As Minister, Thorson
coordinated domestic local volunteer groups in assisting the war campaign,
as well as domestic censorship and propaganda.137 His time in cabinet was
short. A year later, on 6 October 1942, his cabinet colleague, Louis St. Laurent,
recommended Thorson’s appointment as president of the Exchequer Court of
Canada. As Deputy Minister, Varcoe would have supervised the mechanics
of Thorson’s judicial appointment. Two years into a judicial career that would
stretch another twenty, Justice Thorson settled the courtroom and asked Varcoe
to begin his arguments.
Varcoe’s first argument was a sweeping one: “[T]hat the Custodian is not
the Crown, and … that this is not a proper action against His Majesty because
the Custodian is not His Majesty or the servant or agent of His Majesty.”138 The
position had the advantage of dismissing the entirety of the claim and it found some
favour in recent case law.139 It was also purely strategic. Varcoe argued precisely
the opposite a year later when confronted with a dispute between the Custodian
and the Department of National Defence (DND) concerning thousands of
dollars of damage that Canadian soldiers had caused to the Vancouver Japanese
Language School while the DND had leased the premises from the Custodian
during the war. When the Custodian sought compensation for the damage, the
DND sought Varcoe’s support shielding it from liability. Putting his argument
136. Ian Bushnell, The Federal Court of Canada: A History, 1875-1992 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1997) at 124-25. See
also, W Kristjanson, “Hon Joseph Thorarinn Thorson” (1978) 37 The Icelandic Canadian
13. Thorson is best remembered for his contribution to the law of public interest standing.
In the early 1970s, a retired Thorson launched a quixotic attack on the constitutionality of
the Official Languages Act. In the Supreme Court of Canada decision granting him standing
to pursue his claim, Justice Laskin held that “[t]he question of the constitutionality of
legislation has in this country always been a justiciable question. Any attempt by Parliament
or a Legislature to fix conditions precedent, as by way of requiring consent of some public
officer or authority, to the determination of an issue of constitutionality of legislation
cannot foreclose the Courts merely because the conditions remain unsatisfied.” “It would be
strange,” Laskin J held, “and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of
alleged excess of legislative power … could be made the subject of adjudication.”
Thorson v Canada, [1975] 1 SCR 138 at 145, 151, 43 DLR (3d) 1. The result is deeply ironic
when contrasted with Thorson J’s judgment in Nakashima.
137. See The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, SC 1940, c 13, s 2. See generally, Jeffrey
A Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2003) at 27.
138. An incomplete transcript of the hearing is contained in the Nakashima case file. Supra
note 126 at 8-9.
139. Ritcher v Canada, [1943] Ex CR 64.
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in Nakashima out of mind, Varcoe bluntly informed the Custodian that since
both the Custodian and DND operated as instruments of the Crown there could
be no liability between them. A frustrated McPherson pointed out that such a
position was directly at odds with Varcoe’s argument in Nakashima. Varcoe coolly
replied that the contexts were different.140
Varcoe also argued that the relevant orders created no trust. Stressing that
Order 2483 contained two distinct methods by which property might become
vested in the Custodian, Varcoe noted that section 12(1) concerned all property
vested in the Custodian by virtue of being “situated in any protected area,” “turned
over to the Custodian,” or otherwise left behind because of the internment.141
Property which vested under this subsection, Varcoe argued, did not contain any
of the additional protections outlined in section 12(2): Namely, stipulations that
the Custodian was to hold property “for the purpose of protecting the interests
of the owner,” and the promise to “release such property” at the conclusion of the
war.142 Section 12(2) and its protections, he argued, only pertained to property
vested in the Custodian by “order” of the Custodian. All of the property at issue in
this case, Varcoe declared, had vested under section 12(1).143 Accordingly, Varcoe
concluded, the Custodian remained unhindered by any trust and possessed full
discretion to do whatever he liked with the property of Nakashima, Wakabayashi,
and Tanaka, including the power to sell.
As to the constitutional validity of the orders at issue, Varcoe stressed that
the question was beyond judicial competence to review. Relying on the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision Reference Re: Regulations in Relation to Chemicals,144
Varcoe averred that judges could not second-guess what the Governor in Council
deemed “necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare
of Canada.”145 Certain passages of the Chemicals Reference bolstered Varcoe’s
interpretation of virtually absolute deference to government in executing its
140. Varcoe to McPherson, 10 May 1945, “Re Lease – Japanese Language Ass’sn,” Ottawa, LAC
(RG117, vol 2535, file 58998).
141. Section 4 amending Order 1665, s 12(1). Supra note 73.
142. Section 4 amending Order 1665, s 12(2). Ibid.
143. Varcoe’s distinction between the various subsections of section 12 possesses a certain
superficial logic, but falls apart quickly on closer inspection. To begin, there was no property
that would have vested independently under section 12(2), since section 12(1) covered “all
property situated in any protected area … belonging to any person of the Japanese race
resident in such area.” Moreover, the drafting history of Order 2483 makes clear that section
12(2) was intended as an elaboration of the promise of protection outlined in section 12(1),
and was conveyed as such to Japanese Canadians.
144. [1943] SCR 1 at 12, 1 DLR 248 [Chemicals Reference].
145. WMA, supra note 20, s 3.
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legislative capacities in times of war. Noting the “plenary discretion” afforded
by the WMA, in the Chemicals Reference, Chief Justice Duff doubted “that it is
competent to any court to canvass the considerations which have, or may have,
led [the Governor General in Council] to deem such Regulations necessary
or advisable for the transcendent objects set forth.” “The authority and duty
of passing on that question,” Chief Justice Duff stated, “are committed to
those who are responsible for the security of the country—the Executive
Government itself.”146 In rhetoric, reasoning, and result, the Chemicals Reference
followed the judicial trend of extending unfettered deference to government
officials in the exercise of their wartime duties. Varcoe knew he was on sure
footing, especially in making such arguments to a judge present at the cabinet
table only two years prior.
In response, MacLennan challenged Varcoe’s interpretation of the Chemicals
Reference. Arguing that the WMA circumscribed the federal government’s
authority to legislate, MacLennan proposed that since “the liquidation of the
properties has no conceivable relationship to the prosecution of the war,” Order
469 was ultra vires the WMA and hence illegal.147 Since the WMA was itself
only constitutional insofar as it related to the emergency powers of peace, order,
and good government (the constitutional regulation of property normally lying
within provincial jurisdiction), any order passed under the WMA’s authority must
comply strictly with its conditions: “[O]rders and regulations, as [the Governor
General in Council] may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended
war, invasion, insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the security, peace,
order and welfare of Canada.”148 Without saying so explicitly, MacLennan
impressed upon Justice Thorson the continuing constraints of the rule of law,
notwithstanding the existence of war, which suggested that statutes could only
lawfully empower state action in accordance with the purpose and conditions for
which they had been enacted.

146. Chemicals Reference, supra note 144 at 12. The Canadian wartime jurisprudence never cited
American cases from the period, but the points of convergence are striking. In upholding a
similarly broad granting of discretion authorizing curfews imposed upon Japanese Americans
in the “Military Area,” the United States Court held that “[s]ince the Constitution commits
to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and
conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgement
and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and
in the selection of the means for resisting it.” Hirabayashi, supra note 9 at 93.
147. Transcript, supra note 126 at 97.
148. WMA, supra note 20, s 3. See also, Re Gray, supra note 23 at 150.
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As the argument carried over to the following morning, Justice Thorson
questioned whether a judge could ever second-guess government decisions
during war. MacLennan argued that a careful reading of the Chemicals Reference
reinforced the capacity of judicial review.149 Despite a general tone of deference,
MacLennan drew attention to Chief Justice Duff’s concession that in some cases
“the plain terms of the order in council itself ” may indicate that the order was not
deemed “necessary or advisable by reason of the existence of war.”150 MacLennan
bolstered his argument with reliance on Price Brothers, a Supreme Court decision
of the First World War in which a majority struck down a federal order setting
the price of newsprint as bearing insufficient connection “to the perils actual
or possible of real or apprehended war … or … to the prosecution of the war
or the objects of it.”151 The powers of judicial review in relation to war matters
were to be exercised with caution, but that did not mean they did not exist,
MacLennan argued. Turning to the case before them, MacLennan concluded
that the sale of property “does not add one iota to the object of winning the
war or the security of Canada.”152 Without a necessary connection to wartime
security, Order 469, insofar as it authorized the blanket sale of all property, was
therefore unconstitutional.
As to the validity of the power of sale more broadly, MacLennan argued that
“sale might be justifiable if it is for the protection of the property, itself, or the
Japanese because … properties are to be held by the Custodian for the benefit
of the owners, to be managed and controlled for their benefit.”153 MacLennan
rejected Varcoe’s theory that there were two methods of property vesting in
section 12 of Order 2483, arguing instead that subsection 2 was merely an
explanation of subsection 1.154 As an alternative, he stressed that the protective
149. Chemicals Reference, supra note 144.
150. Ibid at 13.
151. Re Price Bros and The Board of Commerce of Canada, [1920] 60 SCR 265 at 272, 54 DLR
286. Duff J (as he then was) also stated: “I think such orders are reviewable, in this sense that
when in a proper proceeding the validity of them is called into question, it is the duty of a
court of justice to consider and decide whether the conditions of jurisdiction are fulfilled
and if they are not being fulfilled, to pronounce the sentence of the law upon the illegal
order.” On the economic theory animating the Court’s decision, see BJ Hibbits, “A Bridle for
Leviathan: The Supreme Court and The Board of Commerce” (1989) 21:1 Ottawa L Rev 65.
152. Transcript, supra note 126 at 113. “As a matter of fact,” MacLennan elaborated, “you could
… say it is more of a war measure for him to maintain the property, to make sure it is being
kept under government control, rather than in the hands of someone who might do some
danger because once the Custodian sells it he has no more control over it.”
153. Ibid at 106.
154. Ibid at 143.
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language of subsection 1, as well as the notion of “management and control,”
similarly enacted a trusteeship premised on the promise that property would be
protected and returned. In addition, he raised a handful of other less persuasive
arguments on the basis of a contract formed between the Custodian and Japanese
Canadians. The crux of his argument, however, lay in two overarching claims:
Order 469 was ultra vires because sale promoted a policy objective divorced from
either emergency or wartime security; and, if Order 469 was intra vires, then the
Custodian’s power to sell under that order was constrained by the trust conditions
imposed by Order 2483.
In reply, Varcoe argued that, even if a trustee, the Custodian was fully entitled
to sell. It is worth quoting Varcoe at length to illustrate how the logic of trust
became contorted to support white supremacist aims.
Varcoe: Suppose … that the Custodian is compelled to sell parcels X,Y,Z, three
blocks of property. Then, the next block is not in such a bad position. I have sold
X, Y, Z to be inhabited by white persons. I could not sell to anyone else. I think it
is undesirable, under those circumstances, that that next parcel should be held by or
for Japanese and therefore I think it is time to sell this property…
Justice Thorson: You mean that the evacuation may be a permanent thing.
Varcoe: It may be that, yes, he does not know.
Justice Thorson: In which case, you could not just leave the properties in a mere state
of management and control, they would have to be sold. You may decide there is an
area which has been inhabited by Japanese people, but you are not going to have any
more Japanese in that district, that is going to be for white people or somebody else;
therefore, you will sell all the houses in that particular block or area.
Varcoe: Yes, some of which are in bad condition. They are in bad condition and
I cannot remove them because they are held by Japanese, too. If I can go to the
purchaser with some kind of assurance that this will be a white man’s property, I
can get a good price for it. Assuming everything in my friend’s favour, these are the
things the Custodian would be bound to take into account in determining whether
or not he would continue to hold the property at this high rental or whether he
would sell it.155

Here the presence of the trust took on a sinister character. Varcoe alleged that
selling everything would be in the interests of Japanese-Canadian owners since
white purchasers would only pay a “good price” with assurance that adjacent
properties would also be sold. Varcoe’s theory that prospective purchasers
would balk at ownership next to a Japanese Canadian was not supported by
evidence—Japanese Canadians had long owned alongside neighbours of other
155. Ibid at 169-70.
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backgrounds and, in rural areas, officials struggled in the face of excess demand
for Japanese-Canadian-owned farms, not the opposite.156 Facts were not Varcoe’s
concern, however. Instead he gestured to a deeper perception: That fulfilling the
terms of the trust required British Columbia to be “white man’s property.”157
Whether Justice Thorson followed this particular logic was unclear.
His interjections pushed towards conceptualizing the permanent exclusion of
Japanese Canadians as an act of emergency:
Justice Thorson: So that the power of sale might have some relationship to the
emergency that brought about the evacuation in the first place and it might be
ancillary.
[…]
Varcoe: I would say that I would doubt whether any greater emergency was created in
the Dominion of Canada than was created by the Japanese situation and everything
which was done in connection with it was ancillary to the emergency.
Justice Thorson: Even sale, after the Custodian had obtained full control.
Varcoe: Yes, that he had to have that wide power to dispose of these properties if, for
nothing else, to satisfy public opinion in Vancouver.158

In his final gesture, Varcoe argued that racial anxiety in British Columbia was
itself a sufficient emergency to authorize government action under the WMA.
With that, two days of argument concluded. “I do not think anyone expects me
to give judgment now,” Justice Thorson said. “Judgement will be reserved.”159
Three years passed with no decision in Nakashima from the Exchequer Court.
During that time, the government completed the bulk of its sales (excluding the
three properties at issue in the Nakashima case), the Second World War ended,
and the government began to exile almost 4,000 Japanese Canadians to Japan.160
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Stanger-Ross & LIRC, “Suspect Properties,” supra note 6 at 276.
See Ward, supra note 4. See also, Roy, supra note 4.
Ibid at 170.
Ibid at 171.
In the summer of 1944, Prime Minister King explained that after the war, “loyal” Japanese
Canadians would be permanently settled in central and eastern Canada, “disloyal” Japanese
Canadians would be exiled to Japan, and any persons wishing to voluntarily return to Japan
could do so at the government’s expense. As the war neared its end, government officials
toured internment sites pressuring Japanese Canadians to sign forms indicating a “desire to
relinquish my British nationality and to assume the status of a national of Japan” in order
to “effect my repatriation to Japan.” By the time of Japan’s official surrender in September
1945, nearly ten thousand people had signed (or had signed on their behalf in the cases
of wives and minors) repatriation forms. Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources,
“House of Commons Debates, 19th Parliament, 5th Session: Vol 6” (4 August 1944), online:
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“Inquiries in Ottawa as to why the decision has not been handed down,” The New
Canadian reported, “draw a blank.”161 The injustice of the delay in releasing the
Nakashima decision began to attract wider attention. In the House of Commons,
Angus MacInnis, the CCF Member of Parliament for Vancouver East, asked
the Liberal Justice Minister to explain how a decision could take three years to
complete. “I regret that condition of affairs,” the Minister admitted, offering only
that “[s]ome judges were slower than others … and perhaps some took more pains
than others.”162 With only two judges, both seemingly beset by procrastination,
delay had become endemic at the Exchequer Court.163 Justice Thorson finally
released his decision on 28 August 1947. There was nothing in the relatively
short judgment of twenty-one paragraphs that would even remotely account for
the three years and three months it took him to decide the case. Nakashima,
Wakabayashi, and Tanaka lost.
Perhaps in part because of the delay, Justice Thorson’s decision largely slipped
from legal and historical attention. By the summer of 1947, the question of
the government’s treatment of Japanese-Canadian-owned property had become
moot—there was no property left to protect. Justice Thorson began his reasons
noting the “Japanese origin[s]” of the “suppliants.” Avoiding any personal details
of the litigants, Justice Thorson explained that Nakashima “is a British subject by
naturalization,” Wakabayashi “a British subject by birth,” and the Tanaka brothers,
“Japanese nationals.”164 Such differences, he ruled, were immaterial—“the answer
in any one case will be equally applicable in the others.”165 Justice Thorson devoted
not another moment to the litigants themselves: their history, families, real
estate, possessions, and lives. Instead, his necessary “sequence of events” detailed
the orders creating the protected area of British Columbia, implementing the
“evacuation,” and dealing with property.166 Turning to the issue of whether the
legal claim had been properly initiated, he noted that the proceedings assumed
that the Custodian held the property “as the servant of the Crown.”167 That,

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

<parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC1905_06/482?r=0&s=1> at 5916-17. In his
speech, King also announced the cessation of all future Japanese immigration. Sunahara,
supra note 3 at 117.
“One for the Lawyers,” The New Canadian (22 February 1947) 2.
Harvey Hickey, “Ilsley in Quandary as MP’s Score Exchequer Court’s Judgment Delays,” The
Globe and Mail (2 July 1944) 10.
Most cases took over a year to be decided, 30 per cent took over two years, and 7 per cent
took over three. Bushnell, supra note 136 at 135.
Nakashima, supra note 9 at 488.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 491.
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Justice Thorson maintained, was a fatal error. Emphasizing the Custodian’s wide
discretion in dealing with property and its independence from government,
he held that the Custodian could neither be characterized as the Crown, nor its
servant.168 The plaintiffs should have sued the Custodian and not the Crown,
he concluded. The case ended before it began.
Despite declaring that “this ends the matter” and expressing misgivings about
even considering the broader issue of constitutional validity, Justice Thorson
decided to address the issue in obiter “since it is of great importance.”169
“[T]he two conditions of jurisdiction prescribed by the War Measures Act have
both been satisfied,” he stated without explication. “It is, therefore, not open
to the Court to question the validity of the order in council empowering the
Custodian to sell the properties vested in him.”170 “The Court has no right,”
he continued, “to substitute its opinion of what is necessary or advisable for that
of the Governor in Council or to question the validity of an order so made.”171
“The Custodian has,” Justice Thorson concluded, “the lawful right to liquidate,
sell, or otherwise dispose of the property vested in him.”172 As to the question of
whether the Custodian was a trustee, he declared that since the Custodian was
not a servant of the Crown the question need not be answered. There was only
one final matter. Justice Thorson ordered Nakashima, Wakabayashi, and Tanaka
to pay the government’s legal costs.
In contrast to the attention The New Canadian gave the case at the outset,
by the time of its release, the result in Nakashima was met with sparse coverage
and only muted disappointment.173 MacLennan informed his clients that
he could see no grounds for appeal.174 Probably Japanese Canadians had long
reconciled themselves to the outcome. Certainly there would have been ample
grounds to have lost faith in the judicial process. By the summer of 1947, more
168. Ibid at 492, 495, 498.
169. Ibid at 498.
170. Ibid at 502. “Parliament,” Thorson J continued, “has left the decision as to the necessity or
advisability of such an order for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada,
not to the Court, but to the Governor in Council.” The non-justiciability of whether
government decisions were necessary or advisable under the WMA had been “conclusively
settled”, Thorson J held, by Reference re Persons of Japanese Race, [1946] SCR 248, 3 DLR
321. Ibid at 504.
171. Ibid at 504.
172. Ibid.
173. “Property Owners’ Petitions Dismissed in Test Cases,” The New Canadian (20
September 1947) 1.
174. “Property Owners Asked to File Loss Claims by November 30,” The New Canadian
(27 September 1947) 10.
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pressing legal matters preoccupied the Japanese-Canadian community, including
the Bird Commission’s inquiry into the Custodian’s sales and continuing orders
restricting the movement and liberty of Japanese Canadians. Their wartime
experiences had also caused Japanese Canadians to shift their attention towards
the project of constitutional change. Just before the Nakashima ruling, a meeting
of Japanese-Canadian organizations in Toronto called for “a national bill of rights
for Canada—to define the fundamental and inalienable rights of citizenship.”175
“The Canadian emergency laws,” The New Canadian editors agreed, “are too
ready-made for a would-be dictator.”176 Legal change, Japanese-Canadian
community leaders would argue for the next half-century, must come in the
form of constitutional rights.
Its relative obscurity has meant that the reasoning in Nakashima has not
received much scrutiny. Certainly, to modern eyes, the case and its reasoning raise
a number of concerns. One might question, at the outset, whether Justice Thorson
should have heard the case in the first place given his membership in the cabinet
that produced several of the orders under review and his recent professional
relationship with the Custodian. While the Exchequer Court only had two
members in 1944, the case could have been assigned to a judge less implicated in
government wartime policy. More pointedly, the delay in hearing and especially
in deciding the case was inexcusable and unjust. Neither the government nor
Justice Thorson dealt with the case with the expediency that the issue required
and deserved. It is also difficult not to see the delay as motivated at least partly by
a desire to dispose of Japanese-Canadian-owned property before the legal issues
in the case were determined. At the very least, Justice Thorson should have issued
an injunction preventing sales until the legality of the Custodian’s actions could
be determined and possibly appealed. Time only sharpens the sense that bad faith
lay at the heart of the government’s handling of the case from the outset.
Justice Thorson was also wrong to uncritically accept the government’s
convenient distinction between the Custodian and Crown as a matter of law.
Without question, the issue was complicated by a common law that effectively
insulated government from legal proceedings. Change and rationalization of
proceedings against the Crown would not arrive in Canada until the 1950s when
Parliament and provincial legislatures enacted legislation that enabled legal claims
against government.177 Perhaps MacLennan should have attempted to sue the
Custodian directly rather than pursuing the Crown via a Petition of Right. But as
175. “Ready-Made for Dictatorship,” The New Canadian (4 October 1947) 2.
176. Ibid.
177. Hogg, Monahan & Wright, supra note 119 at 8-9.
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the Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy stipulated, the Custodian could
not be sued without its consent either. Further, even if the Custodian had granted
consent, the Regulations suggested a claim against the Custodian could only
address a narrow range of issues and certainly not ones involving the constitutional
validity of the orders themselves.178 Given the Petition of Right’s origins in equity,
it was open to Justice Thorson to find that his court provided the only avenue
for the petitioners to question the exercise of the Custodian’s trusteeship and the
constitutional validity of the orders. Nakashima, Wakabayashi, and Tanaka were
defeated not only by the common law’s hostility to Crown liability but also by
Justice Thorson’s narrow interpretation of civil procedure.
Justice Thorson also had questionable grounds for dismissing MacLennan’s
constitutional argument. Orders passed under the WMA were constitutional
only insofar as they complied with the specific preconditions of the WMA itself:
1) by reason of war, invasion, or insurrection; 2) deemed necessary or advisable
by the Governor in Council; and 3) for the security, defence, peace, order and
welfare of Canada.179 The Governor in Council may have favoured the forced sale
of Japanese-Canadian-owned property and the permanent exclusion of Japanese
Canadians from British Columbia, but that policy did not have any connection
to the war beyond timing and opportunity, nor could it be justified as advancing
the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada, notwithstanding racist
prejudice and assumptions to the contrary. Selling Japanese-Canadian-owned
property promoted an altogether different long-standing objective: Making
British Columbia a “white man’s province.” As Justice Murphy of the United
States Supreme Court famously held in dissent in Korematsu, the internment of
Japanese Americans on racial grounds, “goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional
power’ and falls squarely into the ugly abyss of racism.”180 That Justice Thorson
was unwilling or incapable of seeing the forced sales as acts of racism rather than
security does not change their unconstitutional nature.
MacLennan’s strongest argument concerned the promise to protect. Justice
Thorson ignored this argument entirely, but there was ample evidence that the
Custodian controlled and managed the property of Japanese Canadians as a
trustee, including the Custodian’s interpretation of its own mandate. The history
of Order 2483 makes the existence of a trust relationship clear. Read’s critique
of Order 1665 stemmed from his concerns that an insufficient trust relationship
had been established in its drafts. Order 2483 replaced Order 1665 specifically
178. Supra note 31, s 27.
179. Supra note 20.
180. Korematsu, supra note 9 at 233.
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to address that concern and said so in its preamble. McPherson, the policy
architect behind the dispossession and the orders, did not hesitate to describe the
Custodian as a trustee and he deliberately impressed the notion of trusteeship in
communicating the dispossession to Japanese Canadians. The Japanese-Canadian
community, with justifiable suspicion of false motives, relied on the promise to
protect in good faith.
Canadian trust law of the 1940s, as today, recognized that a trust could
be created in a variety of ways, most typically by express words and intent.181
“A trust,” a leading text writer of the period explained, “is an equitable obligation,
binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has
control (which is called the trust property), for the benefit of persons (who are
called the beneficiaries).”182 Whether a trust arises expressly by explicit intention,
or constructively by circumstances and conduct, the legal result is the same:
An obligation on the part of the trustee to manage the property for the benefit
of the beneficiary.183 The circumstances, intentions, and language of Order 2483,
and probably Order 1665 as well, created an express trust. The power to sell,
stipulated from the outset in the Custodian’s powers, was also fully consistent
with the existence of a trust because it may be in the interests of the beneficiary
for the trustee to sell a rapidly deteriorating asset. Significantly, Order 469 did
not amend or repeal Order 2483, it simply confirmed a qualified power of sale
that had always been present in the Custodian’s powers. Content to weave a
promise to protect property into law, to create a trust relationship, and to accept
the cooperation of Japanese Canadians on that basis, Canada abandoned its legal
promise at the moment it was needed most. The Custodian breached that trust
in its negligent treatment of chattels and household goods, in its failure to police
and protect vacant properties, and in its bad faith sales of all Japanese-Canadianowned property in promotion of racist policy objectives unconnected to the war.
The Department of Justice further breached that trust in its bad faith litigation
181. The existence of a trust remained largely a question of the common law, with some
modifications of the duties of a trustee expressed by statute. See Trustee Act, RSBC
1936, c 292, s 2.
182. Sir Arthur Underhill assisted by Edward Bagshawe, The Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees,
9th ed (London: Butterworth & Co, 1939) at 3. See also, Attorney-General of Canada v CC
Fields & Co, [1943] OR 560, 1943 CanLII 97 (Ont CA).
183. Ibid at 8. The duties of the trustee include the duty to manage and treat the property with
a reasonable standard of care. “A trustee is not called upon to be omniscient,” Middleton J
explained. “All that he is called upon to do is honestly to exercise his best judgment, to take
the same care of the property as he would have taken if it had been his own.” Davies v Nelson,
[1928] 1 DLR 254 at 256, 1927 CanLII 452 (Ont CA).
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strategy and its warping of the trust to justify racist ends. In its inexcusable delay,
its failure to recognize the harms suffered by the litigants, and its sanction of
racist policy, motive, and argument, Justice Thorson’s decision in Nakashima
betrayed that promise too.

III. CONCLUSIONS
This legal history has traced the life of a promise of law from its origin to its
demise, chronicling its shifting meanings, interactions, and consequences for the
people whose lives it forever altered. Reading the origins of the promise to protect
alongside its defeat in court helps us to better understand and contextualize both.
Multiple actors shape the life, death, and meaning of law: Drafters and civil
servants crafting government policy into words on a page; the subjects of law in
their acts of interpretation, resistance, and compliance; and the officials, lawyers,
and judges enforcing, arguing, and interpreting law in retrospect. In litigation,
government lawyers turned the trust against the interests of the people it was
intended to protect. More brazenly, the government’s legal objective was to write
the promise to protect out of the law entirely. The history of the dispossession
should not do the same.
The story of this legal promise is one of stark simplicity and tangled
complexity. In important ways, the promise of law was meaningless. Eikichi
Nakashima, Tadao Wakabayashi, Jitaro and Takejiro Tanaka, and thousands of
other Japanese Canadians lost their homes and livelihoods; they lost their court
case too. A long history of failing to see racialized minorities as full citizens,
the unjust association of Japanese Canadians with an enemy country, and
economic and territorial avarice motivated by a commitment to white supremacy
fuelled the dispossession policy. A combination of war, racism, and exclusionary
citizenship gave the patina of legal licence to virtually all discriminatory actions
taken against the Japanese-Canadian community, even those that made no
one safer. Many in British Columbia intended that Japanese Canadians never
return from internment. The Custodian sold the property of Japanese Canadians
without compunction or sanction. Varcoe, in defending the Custodian’s actions,
and Justice Thorson, in his inexcusably delayed ruling, ignored or looked past
the legal trust that had been created. The promise of law failed to halt a single
sale of property.
But the dispossession is also complicated by the presence of a promise.
At earlier moments in the life of the laws of dispossession, figures like Read,
Angus, and Coleman invoked legal principles that should have constrained
government action. They did so in direct response to the actions of Japanese
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Canadians. McPherson believed, and rightly so, that the laws of dispossession
imposed a trustee relationship between the Custodian and Japanese Canadians.
MacLennan had a legal case to argue because the activism of Japanese Canadians
carved a promise of protection into law. Acknowledging this complexity does not
absolve the federal government of responsibility for the promise’s ultimate breach.
As Tina Loo has argued, “oppression is not automatic and the reproduction of
relations of domination is not straightforward because the power of the law is
not totalizing.” History, by foregrounding people in their variety, ambiguity,
and complexity, renders visible the “opportunities within the rule of law and the
larger discourse from which it is derived” for alternative outcomes.184 A different
history would have been possible had promises been honoured. Remembering
the dispossession only as a story of the power of sale runs the risk of perpetuating
a narrative adopted by government actors in order to conceal the legal significance
of the promise to protect. The laws of dispossession and Nakashima are a story
not only of law’s will to power, but its will to promise as well. That those promises
lay broken and abandoned with such injustice should not obscure the ways in
which the law finds meaning not only in after-the-fact judicial interpretation,
but in the good faith actions and interpretations of the people subject to its rule.
This article is also about the role of vulnerable citizens in making law and
resisting state power, and the limits of the rule of law. Japanese Canadians
demanded and placed their trust in the promise to protect, just as they prepared
for it to be broken. Alert to the possibility that some British Columbians would
attempt to use a temporary state of war to exile Japanese Canadians from the
province, they interrogated state action and sought to hold officials to their
own principles and legal promises. While Japanese Canadians were shocked by
the betrayal of the promise, their legal challenge was also part of a vigilance to
uphold the law and an expression of faith in legality. Disappointment in the
Nakashima ruling did not end the community’s engagement with legal promises.
In the decades after the conclusion of their legal challenge, Japanese Canadians
continued to remind the government in public testimony, Royal Commission
hearings, the redress movement, and courts of law, of the legal significance of the
broken promise.185
184. Tina Loo, Making Law, Order, and Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 162.
185. See the powerful testimony of the National Association of Japanese Canadians at the
special parliamentary hearings prior to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, (Government of Canada:
Ottawa, 1980) at 13:6.
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In 1968, Nakashima and the promise to protect returned briefly to the
legal spotlight. Torazo Iwasaki sued the federal government, alleging that the
Custodian had breached its trust obligations in selling his land on Salt Spring
Island in 1945 without his consent.186 Relying on Justice Thorson’s reasoning in
Nakashima, Justice Sheppard of the Exchequer Court held that “the discretionary
powers of the Custodian are inconsistent with any trust.”187 Iwasaki’s “complaint
is without foundation,” the judge declared.
The complaint is that orders-in-council 1665 and 2483 set up a trust to return the
lands to the suppliant, wherefore the lands vested in the Custodian as trustee under
duty to manage and return, and that order-in-council 469 in authorizing a sale, was
void. That was an error; there was no trust … nor was there any breach of trust.188

After hearing Iwasaki’s appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada
issued its decision orally from the bench. “We are all of the opinion that the
appeal fails,” Justice Fauteux informed the courtroom. “The property in question
in these proceedings became vested in the Custodian by legislative action.
He had the power to sell and he did sell.”189 Nakashima has not been cited by a
court of law since.
The rule of law project is a long one, and legal history can play a key role
within it by excavating lost promises and the people and stories behind them. The
history of the dispossession revealed here suggests that the forced sales should be
approached not simply as bad law but as the unlawful manipulation of the law.
Ultimately, the promise of law encompasses more than the responsibilities encoded
in any specific law. The rule of law is also a promise, perhaps especially necessary
in times of emergency, to rule by a legal order of good faith, non-discrimination,
and rationality.190 Telling the dispossession as a story of promises highlights the
extent and tragedy of the government’s breach but it also helps to reclaim a deeper
set of principles of justice and the promises of legality that the law makes to all.

186. Further, the agent of the Custodian, GC Mouat, sold Iwasaki’s land to a company, Salt
Spring Lands Ltd, in which Mouat held a 20 per cent interest. Iwasaki v Canada, [1969]
1 Ex CR 281 at para 35, 2 DLR (3d) 241.
187. Ibid at para 21.
188. Ibid at para 49.
189. R v Iwasaki, [1970] SCR 437 at 438, CanLII 191 (SCC).
190. “Surely,” Lon Fuller wrote, “it is not only in the affairs of everyday life that we need clarity
about the obligation of fidelity to law, but most particularly and urgently in times of
trouble.” Lon L Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958)
71:4 Harv L Rev 630 at 634. See also, David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in
a Time of Emergency (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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IV. APPENDICES:
A. ORDER IN COUNCIL 1665

Order in Council 1665
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA
WEDNESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF MARCH, 1942
PRESENT:
HIS EXCELLENCY
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:
WHEREAS in view of the serious situation prevailing in the Province of
British Columbia arising out of the war with Japan it is deemed necessary for the
security and defence of Canada to take further steps for the evacuation of persons
of the Japanese race from the protected areas in that Province;
NOW, THEREFORE, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable
W.L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, and under and by virtue of the powers
conferred by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of
Canada, 1927, is pleased to make the following regulations and they are hereby
made and established accordingly:
…
Custody of Japanese Property
12. (1) As a protective measure only, all property situated in any protected
area of British Columbia belonging to any person of the Japanese race resident in
such area (excepting fishing vessels subject to Order in Council P.C. 288 of the
13th January, 1942, and deposits of money, shares of stock, debentures, bonds or
other securities), delivered up to any person by the owner pursuant to the Order
of the Minister of Justice dated February 25, 1942, or which is turned over to the
Custodian by the owner, or which the owner, on being evacuated, is unable to
take with him, shall be vested in and subject to the control and management of
the Custodian as defined in the Regulations respecting Trading with the Enemy,
1939; provided, however, that no commission shall be charged by the Custodian
in respect of such control and management.
(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, and for the purposes of the control
and management of such property, rights and interest by the Custodian, the
Regulations respecting Trading with the Enemy, 1939, shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the same extent as if such property, rights and interests belonged to
any enemy within the meaning of the said Regulations.
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(3) The property, rights and interests so vested in and subject to the control
and management of the Custodian, or the proceeds thereof, shall be dealt with in
such manner as the Governor in Council may direct.
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B. ORDER IN COUNCIL 2483

Order in Council 2483
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA
Friday, the 27th day of March, 1942.
PRESENT:
HIS EXCELLENCY
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:
WHEREAS by Order in Council P.C. 1665 dated March 4th, 1942, the
British Columbia Security Commission was established for the purpose of
planning, supervising and directing the evacuation from the protected areas
of British Columbia of all persons of the Japanese race and for such purpose
was empowered to determine amongst other things all matters relative to the
placement of such persons;
AND WHEREAS it is represented to the Minister of Justice that it is
desirable to provide that any plan with regard to the placement of such persons
be limited to making provision for the temporary placement only of such persons
during the continuation of the state of war now existing and that the authority
of the Commission should include power to vary or amend any placement order;
AND WHEREAS recommendations have been made to the Minister of
Justice by the British Columbia Security Commission to the effect that a greater
degree of protective control over persons of the Japanese race and the property of
such persons be provided for than was provided for by the Order establishing the
Commission, above referred to;
NOW, THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council,
on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and under and by virtue of
the powers conferred by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206, R.S.C., 1927,
is pleased to amend the Regulations established by Order in Council P.C. 1665,
dated March 4th, 1942, as follows:
Regulation one is hereby amended by adding thereto the following paragraph:
“(bb) ‘Person of the Japanese race’ means any person of the Japanese race
required to leave any protected area of British Columbia by Order of the Minister
of Justice under Regulation 4, as amended, of the Defence of Canada Regulations
(Consolidation) 1941”
Regulation ten is hereby amended by adding thereto the following paragraphs:
“(5) Any such plan or plans shall make provision for the temporary placement
only of such persons during the continuation of the state of war now existing.
…
Regulation twelve is hereby rescinded and the following substituted therefore:
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“12(1) Subject as hereinafter in this Regulation provided, as a protective
measure only, all property situated in any protected area of British Columbia
belonging to any person of the Japanese race resident in such area (excepting
fishing vessels subject to Order in Council P.C. 288 of the 13th January, 1942,
and deposits of money, shares of stock, debentures, bonds or other securities),
delivered up to any person by the owner pursuant to an Order of the Minister of
Justice, or which is turned over to the Custodian by or on behalf of the owner,
or which the owner, on being evacuated from the protected area, is unable to
take with him, shall be vested in and subject to the control and management
of the Custodian as defined in the Regulations respecting Trading with the
Enemy, (1939); provided, however, that no commission shall be charged by the
Custodian in respect of such control and management.
“(2) The Custodian may, notwithstanding anything contained in this
Regulation, order that all or any property whatsoever, situated in any protected
area of British Columbia, belonging to any person of the Japanese race shall,
for the purpose of protecting the interests of the owner or any other person,
be vested in the Custodian, and the Custodian shall have full power to administer
such property for the benefit of all such interested persons, and shall release
such property upon being satisfied that the interests aforesaid will not be
prejudiced thereby.
“(3) For the purposes of the control and management of such property
by the Custodian, the Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with the
Enemy, (1939), shall apply mutatis mutandis to the same extent as if the property
belonged to any enemy within the meaning of the said Consolidated Regulations.”
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C. ORDER IN COUNCIL 469

Orders in Council 469
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA
Tuesday, the 19th day of JANUARY, 1943
PRESENT:
HIS EXCELLENCY
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:
…
That by Orders in Council relating to the property of persons of the Japanese
race evacuated from the protected areas of British Columbia, the Custodian
has been vested with the responsibility of controlling and managing property
belonging to persons of the Japanese race who have been evacuated from the
protected areas, except deposits of money, shares of stock, debentures, bonds or
other securities or other property which the owner on being evacuated from the
protected areas was able to take with him; and
That the evacuation of persons of the Japanese race from the protected areas
has now been substantially completed and that it is necessary to provide facilities
for liquidation of property in appropriate cases.
THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the
recommendation of the Secretary of State, concurred by the Minister of Mines
and resources, the Minister of Pensions and National Health, the Minister
of Labour and the Minister of Fisheries, and under the authority of the War
Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased
to order and doth hereby order as follows:
…
Wherever, under Orders in Council under the War Measures Act, Chapter
206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, the Custodian has been vested
with the power and responsibility of controlling and managing any property of
persons of the Japanese race evacuated from the protected areas, such power and
responsibility shall be deemed to include and to have included from the date
of the vesting of such property in the Custodian, the power to liquidate, sell,
or otherwise dispose of such property; and for the purpose of such liquidation,
sale or other disposition the Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with
the Enemy (1939) shall apply mutatis mutandis as if the property belonged to an
enemy within the meaning of the said Consolidated Regulations.

